Oberlin

Digital Commons at Oberlin
Honors Papers

Student Work

2009

After the Fact: El Mercurio and the Re-Writing of the Pinochet
Dictatorship
Julia Brown-Bernstein
Oberlin College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors
Part of the History Commons

Repository Citation
Brown-Bernstein, Julia, "After the Fact: El Mercurio and the Re-Writing of the Pinochet Dictatorship"
(2009). Honors Papers. 474.
https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors/474

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Digital Commons at Oberlin. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Honors Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Oberlin. For
more information, please contact megan.mitchell@oberlin.edu.

After the Fact:
El Mercurio and the Re-Writing of the Pinochet Dictatorship
Julia Brown-Bernstein

Candidate for Senior Honors in History
Steven S. Volk, Thesis Advisor
Submitted Spring 2009

Contents

Acknowledgments

3

Introduction: History and Memory in Contemporary Chile

5

Chapter One: Collective Memory, El Mercurio, and Twentieth Century Chilean History

15

Chapter Two: Pinochet in La Moneda: The Ideology and Practice of Authoritarian

48

Conservatism in Chile

Chapter Three: Re-Shaping Conservative History and Memory after 1990

76

Conclusion: El Mercurio and Social Memory After the Fact

126

Bibliography

130

Appendix

136

2

Acknowledgements:
This thesis is nothing if not a collaboration, and I wish to thank many individuals
who have participated significantly in helping me to complete it. First and foremost, I
would like to share my deepest gratitude with Professor Steven Volk. Since I first took
his class, “Dirty Wars and Democracy” in the fall of my sophomore year, Professor Volk
has not only been my professor and advisor, soundly guiding and challenging me to look
critically at the discipline of history, but also my mentor. Over the years, Professor Volk
has shared with me his boundless knowledge of Latin America’s myriad histories as well
as his personal ties to Chile and the study of memory within Chilean historiography.
Professor Volk has propelled and encouraged my interest in Chilean history and has
invested greatly in the realization of this project. His dedicated readings of this thesis,
constructive criticism, and editing have undoubtedly sharpened the analysis and taught
me a great deal about what it takes to interpret historical data and communicate findings.
I am extremely grateful for all that Professor Volk has done for me since we met.
I am also profoundly grateful to a number of other Oberlin professors including
Carol Lasser, whose guidance, endless support, and understanding throughout the history
honors seminar was essential for the completion of this project. I would also like to thank
Sebastiaan Faber, who was always of great assistance in thinking about memory theory
and its application within Latin America; and Professor Renee Romano, whose class
“Historical Memory in the United States” I have had the privilege to take throughout the
critical period of writing this thesis. Many of the readings and ideas we discussed in
Professor Romano’s class have greatly influenced the arguments and interpretations I
make in the following pages.

3

A Jerome Davis Research award and an Artz grant from Oberlin allowed me to
conduct research in Santiago, Chile in August of 2008. While in Santiago, I met a number
of individuals without whom this project would never have seen the light of day. In
particular, I would like to thank Dr. Claudio Durán, whose generosity and openness in
allowing me into his home to conduct an interview, has, in turn, led to an extremely
meaningful exchange about the nature of memory, its connection to the media and El
Mercurio’s role in relation to both. I would also like to thank Dr. Claudia Lagos, whose
wealth of knowledge about Chilean journalism and specifically, El Mercurio, was
instrumental in the development of my ideas for this thesis.
Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank my family—the team! There are
no words to express my gratitude to Alison Bernstein, Prudence Brown, Paul Stetzer and
Emma Brown-Bernstein for their unconditional love and support. There are no four
people who have inspired, challenged, and shaped me more than these four individuals
and for that and much, much more I am truly grateful.

4

Introduction: History and Memory in Contemporary Chile
The exhibit of Chilean history in Santiago’s Museo Histórico Nacional (National
History Museum) abruptly ends with a pair of shattered eyeglasses inside an otherwise
empty display case. The half-pair of eyeglasses, which belonged to Salvador Allende,
Chile’s socialist president from 1970-73, were broken on September 11, 1973 when
Augusto Pinochet and Chile’s armed forces violently overthrew Allende’s Unidad
Popular government. Today, the blackened lens and twisted frames make up the only
piece of material culture to represent the last thirty-five years of Chilean national history.
Representing a national history of the period between the coup of 1973 and 1990
when Augusto Pinochet’s seventeen-year dictatorship finally came to a close looms large
in present day Chile. In fact, writing a national history of Allende’s government and the
brutal dictatorship that followed it has been such a fraught process that today, nearly
twenty years after the country’s transition back to civilian rule, Chile has yet to reach
consensus over its recent and not-so recent past – and thus the empty space which follows
Allende’s glasses in the Museo Nacional. While Chile may never reach consensus about
the meaning of Pinochet’s dictatorship, over time one historical narrative will most likely
displace the others and become hegemonic.
Over the past eighteen years, historians, scholars, journalists, and other social
actors—all with different political projects and historical interpretations—have struggled
to engrave their particular narrative of Pinochet’s dictatorship as Chile’s official national
history. This thesis examines the narrative construction of one of the parties to that
dispute, the Chilean Right, as it built and revised its story of the past after Pinochet left
Chile’s presidential palace. This project, moreover, explores the reconstruction of a
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conservative historical narrative as it seeks to define Chile’s past in the present and for
the future.
******
Since the coup of 1973 that ousted the democratically-elected president, Salvador
Allende, Chilean conservatives and supporters of Augusto Pinochet have constructed a
narrative that has dominated public discourse by virtue of the military regime’s control
over most means of communication as well as the political and institutional state. This
narrative portrays Pinochet’s dictatorship as having saved the Chilean nation (patria)
from Allende’s totalitarian Unidad Popular government. However, beginning in the latter
half of Pinochet’s rule but gaining ground in the post-dictatorship period, this “salvation”
narrative has been challenged by “counter memory” narratives, which seek to destabilize
the Right’s dominant account and expose the human rights violations committed under
Pinochet’s rule.
The past eighteen years of center-left government under the Concertación
alliance have brought cascading historical disclosures that formally challenged the status
of Pinochet and legally and seriously damaged the credibility of his regime. To be sure,
as incriminating documentation has come to light and proponents of “‘counter-memory”’
narratives have, in turn, gained greater influence in the discourse of historical memory,
the Right’s ability to impose its own narrative of the dictatorial period has waned. Yet
since 1990, Chilean conservatives and Pinochet supporters, along with the media voices
which reflect their viewpoints, have waged battles with other sectors of society to obtain
cultural and historiographic hegemony over this contested past — how the history of the
1970-1990 period will be written. To be clear, this is not solely about historical
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“revisionism,” an essential component in the process of writing history, but also historical
re-evaluation, which, according to Susan Crane, “affects not only what later generations
think they know about the past, it also affects the historical actors themselves, when
contemporary history is at stake.”1
A close examination of the post-Pinochet period, defined here as 1990-2006, the
years between the return to civilian government and Pinochet’s death, offers insights into
the battles waged to write the history of this critical era in Chilean history. It represents a
particularly rich, if fraught opportunity to analyze this historiographic process because
the writers of most concern are not professional historians but “popular” sources in the
media and public life; and the audience is not academics, but the Chilean population
itself. The battle to define (not just “interpret”) Chilean history as it unfolds in the
contemporary era is a memory battle, in which those who personally experienced this
past fight to inscribe their history for a future they will not see.
For Chile’s Right, the period after 1990 has been a difficult time as more and
more revelations have damaged Pinochet’s reputation. Consequently, Chile’s
conservatives have used this time to attempt to shape even more forcefully their own
interpretation of Chile’s national history, refashioning their master, “salvation” narrative
and directly challenging the memory of the Chilean Left. As the reader will see, this has
largely entailed redefining exactly what happened between the election of Salvador
Allende in 1970 and Pinochet’s final departure from the presidential palace in 1990.
******

1

Susan Crane, “Memory, Distortion, and History in the Museum,” History and Theory
36:4 (December 1997), 60.
7

History as a discipline recognizes that although we access the past through
multiple sources—interviews and archives, among others – these sources don’t by
themselves yield a meaning of the past. While multiple understandings of these archives
surface, those interpretations, while hopefully remaining faithful to the sources, still
constantly change because of circumstances in the present. Despite concerted efforts by
some to “close” the past— to stabilize a single narrative —the production of history is a
never-ending process, and historical revision—the historians’ task in the present – a
standard practice. With this in mind, my project examines the way in which a
Conservative narrative of the 1970-1990 period changed over the first fourteen years of
restored civilian government even though it insisted on the “completed” nature of that
history and resisted revisions to its own (previous) interpretations. In that way, this thesis
illustrates not just the construction of a particular ideological view of the past in Chile,
but the contested “production of history” as it takes place in the public sphere.2
Although a great deal has been written about Chilean historical memory, the bulk
of this scholarship in Chile has emerged from a progressive, Left community that has
largely examined the memories of those who experienced suffering and loss as a result of
Pinochet’s dictatorship. While these works are highly important and can help us approach
restorative future politics, there are few studies of an evolving conservative narrative that
explain the 1973 coup and Pinochet’s dictatorship.
The Right in Chile is by no means monolithic or homogeneous; there is no one
conservative narrative of this time period, even though most conservatives will agree on
the basic notion that the Pinochet coup saved the country from disaster. Yet it remains to
2

For more on the “production of history” see: David William Cohen, The Combing of
History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 1.
8

be seen how those who supported Pinochet at the outset of his dictatorship have come to
understand him now that he is no longer in power. Have the public disclosures of his
human rights abuses which have lent legitimacy to the proliferation of counter memory
narratives led the Right to view Pinochet’s dictatorship differently? If the Right’s
historical vision has changed, how is this, then, reflected in the narrative it is constructing
about the period of Pinochet’s dictatorship and beyond?
While this project explores the production of a vernacular national history in
Chile, it chooses for its focus the narrative construction of an exceedingly controversial
and contested period in this history. First, because it examines the writing of a recent
past, questions of memory, and the complicated nature of collective memory, become an
indispensable part of its subject. When those who personally experienced the past which
is being defined and revised are still alive, as is the case with Chile, the struggle to
institutionalize a particular narrative becomes a highly contentious task. Still, since this
thesis concerns only “popular” history, not the work of scholars, it will not consider the
ways in which academic history can come into conflict with the weight of personal
experience. 3 Second, as stated above, this thesis examines the recording of Chilean
national history. Writing a singular narrative of a nation’s history, the synthesis of
disparate views, is always a difficult task. Because this narrative seeks to influence how
the nation views itself and simultaneously vies to become the only way to understand the
past, further layers of complication and conflict are inevitable. Within this context, issues
of historical exclusion, perversion, and erasure become commonplace. Third, this project

3

For an interesting discussion of this within the context of one contentious museum
exhibit, see Edward Linenthal and Tom Engelhart, eds., History Wars: The Enola Gay
and Other Battles for the American Past (New York: Metropolitan Books), 1996.
9

examines the history of a profoundly divisive and disruptive past, a past that is, it is fair
to say, among the most disturbing in Chile’s national history. As studies of the Holocaust
have suggested, it is easier to talk about the suffering one has received as opposed to the
suffering one has caused.4 As the wounds of Pinochet’s dictatorship are deep and fresh,
historical narratives of such atrocity and social conflict are all the more contentious, all
the more so in that, as opposed to the Holocaust, Chilean society has not yet reached
consensus as to whether those who inflicted the suffering are responsible for serious
crimes or were doing “what needed to be done.”
******
This thesis examines the construction of a popular conservative historical memory
specifically though an analysis of Chile’s newspaper of record, El Mercurio. As the
country’s leading conservative outlet, one can safely say that El Mercurio is the voice—
vocero—of the Right in Chile. First founded in 1827 but later established in 1900 in
Santiago by the very affluent Edwards family, El Mercurio has garnered a degree of
power and influence in Chilean society unrivaled by any other media source.5
Its location at the heart of conservative politics in Chile has also made El
Mercurio into a site of memory (lieux de mémoire) in Chilean history.6 The archive of El
Mercurio is a central site where the Right in Chile has located its memories and through
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See Edward Linenthal, Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create America’s
Holocaust Museum (New York: Viking, 1995).
5
It must be noted that, as with the British press, for example, print media in Chile has
long been associated with political orientations that shape their coverage of the news as
well as the editorial pages. To be well informed, readers will consult a variety of
newspapers, not just one. Presently, El Mercurio faces more competition than it ever did
before, but not enough to destabilize its reputation as the newspaper of record.
6
Pierre Nora, Rethinking France = Les Lieux De Mémoire (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2001).
10

which it will revise its narratives of the past. In short, El Mercurio is a vital source to
study the Right’s (re)production of the meaning of the 1973-1990 period in Chilean
history.
While El Mercurio has been for nearly two hundred years the privileged media
voice of the Right and a key player in the formation of Chilean conservative memory, one
also studies El Mercurio because of the ways it has helped mold Chilean cultural and
political identity. El Mercurio claims to be not just a shaper of public opinion, but the
“representative” of Chilean society—the cultural agent that dictates the terms of what it
means to be Chilean. That El Mercurio is not just the “voice” of the Right but also the
self-proclaimed definer of chilenidad (Chilean nationality) necessitates an examination of
the crafting of its post-dictatorship historical narrative.
Many studies have been published that examine El Mercurio’s ideology and its
critical role in both the overthrow of Allende and during the course of Pinochet’s
regime.7 But there is little scholarship regarding El Mercurio’s historical memory
narrative, particularly since the return to civilian rule, that is, the different ways El
Mercurio has represented and inserted Chile’s recent past of authoritarian rule into a
larger narrative about Chile’s history. For El Mercurio, a newspaper that has, despite its
conservative biases, maintained its reputation as a defender of democracy and democratic
ideals, constructing a narrative of Pinochet’s dictatorship poses familiar and not-so
familiar challenges.

7

El Mercurio was a propaganda machine during Allende’s dictatorship and helped
facilitate his overthrow. El Mercurio was also, for majority of Pinochet’s dictatorship, the
only media outlet permitted to continue publishing.
11

Since the country’s independence, Chileans have come to emphasize their
democratic tradition and continuity, particularly in relation to other Latin American
countries. Major schools of Chilean historiography, at least since the mid-nineteenth
century, have reinforced this narrative—what some would call a “whiggish”
interpretation— and written history to reflect Chile’s imagined unending progress even
during times of democratic rupture.8 It is fair to say that Chile has indeed enjoyed a more
prolonged history of constitutional government than all of its neighbors. And the
absorption of this view at a popular level, the “myth” that Chilean political stability since
the 1830s was synonymous with an uncontested and continual growth of democracy, was
not seriously challenged until the coup of 1973 and the dictatorship that followed.9 But
by all standard measures, as confirmed by solid evidence, Pinochet’s seventeen-year rule
was a repressive and authoritarian dictatorship. As such, his years in power represent a
critical rupture of Chile’s political traditions that must call forth, at the very least, a
reexamination, if not a revision, of that prior narrative.
An analysis of the period between the coup of September 11, 1973 and the end of
Pinochet’s dictatorship in 1990, then, can turn Chile’s longstanding historiography of
democratic stability on its head. For those who supported this whiggish approach, and El
Mercurio is certainly a representative of this within the popular sphere, the challenge in
the post-dictatorship period is whether or how to revise its historical memory narrative in

8

Among Chilean historians most noted for their conservative (positivist) approaches, one
can site the work of Diego Barros Arana, Miguel Luís Amunátegui, and Domingo
Amunátegui in the nineteenth century or Mario Góngora in the twentieth.
9
Tomás Moulian’s influential book, Chile Actual: Anatomia de un mito, explores how
the “myth” of Chilean democracy has unraveled since the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship.
Tomás Moulian, Chile Actual: Anatomía De Un Mito (Santiago, Chile : ARCIS
Universidad, LOM Ediciones, 1997).
12

the face of what was an irrefutably undemocratic period of Chilean history. My thesis
explores this challenge, examining the discursive ways in which El Mercurio seeks to
reinsert Pinochet’s dictatorship into a national narrative of democracy and progress. At
the same time, as an extension of this work, my thesis raises questions about the
responsibilities of the media as they seek to create a historical narrative. If a newspaper,
which is a key ingredient of democratic society and ideals, can transform a period of
authoritarian rule—of unjustifiable death and torture—into a period that strengthened
democracy, then what is at stake for Chilean democracy in the present and future?
******
This thesis is organized into an introduction, three chapters, and a conclusion. In
the first chapter, I explore some prevailing theories within the field of collective memory,
and how these have been applied in the context of the Southern Cone and, ultimately,
Chile. I also introduce the reader to the general contours of twentieth century Chilean
history and trace the political context preceding Allende’s election and, three years later,
Pinochet’s coup. I conclude chapter one by situating El Mercurio in its historical and
journalistic context and explain why it has become an important site through which one
can study how conservatives have viewed Chile’s recent history.
In chapter two, I examine more closely the 1973 coup and Pinochet’s dictatorship.
Specifically I discuss the development of a new conservative politics and ideology as
they unfolded after September 11, 1973 and evolved throughout Pinochet’s seventeenyear rule. In this chapter I will also explore El Mercurio’s role both in reporting Chile’s
“New Right” as well as in helping to bring it into creation.
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Finally in chapter three, I offer an empirical analysis of El Mercurio’s editorial
and news writing between 1990-2006 and suggest whether and how Chile’s foremost
conservative media outlet revised its historical narrative of the past. I explore five
different time moments and locate the changing ways El Mercurio modified its vision of
the 1970-1990 period through its mediation with present circumstances and historical
revelations.
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Chapter One: Collective Memory, El Mercurio, and Twentieth Century Chilean History
Each day, whenever El Mercurio hits Chile’s ubiquitous kiosks, the battle to write
a national history of the past thirty-five years is fought out once again. El Mercurio’s
unfolding narrative of Pinochet’s dictatorship does not fall within the confines of
academic history as written by professional scholars. Rather it is history created in a
popular mode—what some might call vernacular history—but it competes to define the
meaning of Pinochet’s seventeen-year rule every bit as much as academic histories and,
arguably, its chances of success are many times greater. As with other groups struggling
to engrave their historical narrative in the public domain, El Mercurio’s history, while it
might incorporate documented evidence to verify “what happened” in the past, primarily
appeals to the “historical consciousness” that is beyond text, deriving instead from
collective experience and memory; its goal is not the generation of a “definitive” history,
but rather to determine how what happened should be remembered.
In this chapter, I explore the ways in which the writing of the history of
Pinochet’s dictatorship within the public (popular) domain treads inexorably on the
terrain of memory, and in particular, collective memory. To the extent that there is no
established (consensual) national narrative of Pinochet’s regime, nothing to follow the
display of Allende’s glasses in the Museo Nacional Histórico; to the extent that textbooks
of Chilean history end with (or before) the coup of 1973; and to the extent that those who
lived through this contested period are still present to debate its vastly different
interpretations (Pinochet is variously described as a brutal dictator and a national
liberator), the realm of collective memory becomes the battleground upon which a
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popular struggle to define the past unfolds. When one reads El Mercurio, one reads an
historical account that seeks to shape not just how the Chilean public understands but also
remembers its collective past, and how that past pertains to the present and future.
El Mercurio’s national history narrative is what one historian, Steve Stern, calls a
collective or emblematic memory narrative. Collective or emblematic memory narratives
look broadly at a period of history and establish a coherent story that interprets the events
of the past in a way that can resonate with the prior expectations of the general public.
These narratives are not necessarily constructed by professional historians, but rather by
social actors who work in the public domain to ensure that their version of the past
becomes official history. While many understand memory as the experience of one
individual, Stern and others maintain that emblematic or collective memories are formed
by underlying social frameworks acting to influence how a group or society as a whole
remembers its past. Indeed there is a level of mutual interaction in which one’s personal
memories inform the collective memory and the underlying collective memory shapes the
individual memory.
Since the end of Pinochet’s brutal seventeen-year dictatorship, an increasing
number of collective memory narratives have represented Pinochet’s regime as a period
of intense “rupture, persecution, and awakening.”10 Stories (and histories) that had been
repressed by the state or denied a public forum resurfaced after 1990 to challenge the
dominant “salvation” history of the dictatorship. Yet the post-dictatorial period has not
only seen narratives emerge from the (formerly silenced) Left. Conservatives also work

10

See Steve J. Stern Remembering Pinochet's Chile: On the Eve of London, 1998
(Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 2006). This is the first of Stern’s trilogy of works
on the topic.
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to define the past, but their task and objectives are quite different. If the Left must give
voice to its long buried stories, the Right must figure out how to shoe-horn a 17-year long
dictatorship into a national narrative that has, for well more than a century, privileged the
(imagined or real) liberal, democratic, constitutional traditions of Chile.
As stated above, El Mercurio’s on-going construction of a post-Pinochet national
history narrative was not written by professional historians and its audience was lay
citizens not academics. This thesis, then, does not hold El Mercurio to “professional”
standards of history production, nor does it question the paper’s engagement with
historical revisionism, itself an essential component of historical work. What is of more
concern and what this thesis seeks to examine is El Mercurio’s efforts to authorize its
national history of Pinochet’s dictatorship.
Taking into account the ways in which El Mercurio’s historical narrative of the
Pinochet dictatorship operates within the matrix of social memory, this chapter will
briefly examine some of the burgeoning literature on collective memory. It will discuss
how collective memory theory has been revised as it has been applied to Southern Cone,
and more specifically, Chilean history in the latter part of the twentieth century. Because
the memory story/ies of Chile presupposes a certain familiarity with the political and
social background of the country, this chapter will also provide the reader with a brief
overview of twentieth century Chilean history. Finally this chapter will introduce El
Mercurio as key subject in the formation of conservative collective memory in Chile.
Prevailing Theories of Collective, Historical, and Social Memory
Much of the scholarship on historical memory comes from the work of French
intellectuals who, starting in the aftermath of World War II, began to theorize the
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relationship of history to memory by examining the “national memory” of France. It is
important to note that this interest in historical memory occurred in the wake of France’s
dismal military and rather unsteady political record in the 20th century. Recognizing that
societies seek ways to commemorate and recover “what once was,” especially if, as in
this case, “what once was” seemed more noble and glorious than the current era, these
scholars tried to understand how and why the various means of remembering France’s
national past—the physical places, images, and language—had changed over time. In
other words, why did some collective memories of France endure the test of time while
others faded into oblivion?
The passage of time diminishes memory, both personal (as we well know), and
collective. Those memories we once had of a certain event—be it an event we
experienced personally or collectively as a nation—are therefore continually evolving. As
we (individually, collectively) become distant from the date of the event itself, some
memories remain and are subject to revision while others are simply forgotten,
suggesting that they no longer hold much relevance in the present. These issues raise a
number of questions, not the least of which are the ways in which societies remember the
past, the way in which the present continually transforms the past, and the propensity of
power to promote or suppress memories.11
In answering these questions, I am primarily drawing from the work of Maurice
Halbwachs, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Nora.12 Any theoretical discussion of collective
memory begins with the work of Maurice Halbwachs, certainly the scholar who opened
11

See, for example, John Urry, “How Societies Remember the Past,” The Sociological
Review (1996), 46.
12
This synthesis borrows heavily from Patrick H. Hutton, History as an Art of Memory
(Burlington, Vt.: University of Vermont, 1993).
18

the field to contemporary study. Halbwachs (1877- 1945), a sociologist by training, did
much of his work on memory before the Second World War and was heavily influenced
by France’s experiences during World War I. His findings, largely ignored while he was
alive, reemerged in the late 1960s and the 1970s through the work of Michel Foucault,
Phillippe Ariés, and Maurice Agulhon.13
Maurice Halbwachs’s theory of collective memory first emerged in Las Cadres
Sociaux de la Mémoire (1925) where he presents three main arguments.14 First,
Halbwachs argues that collective memory is a social construction; rather than an arbitrary
grouping of personal memories, it is the deliberate (if unconscious) union of comparable
individual memories. According to Halbwachs, individual memories over time coalesce
into one idealized image of the past that constitutes a collective memory.15 The jump
from individual to collective memory entails a process of selection. Those individual
memories that cease to resonate over time within a certain group diminish and are
eventually forgotten. Inasmuch as it is individuals who remember the past and not
groups, Halbwachs claims that “there are as many collective memories as there are
groups and institutions in society.”16
The coalescing of individual memories over time, however, relies on social
groups to carry out the work of remembering, consciously or unconsciously. Herein lies
Halbwachs’ second point, one that has since helped contemporary historians understand
the complex relation between history and memory. Halbwachs claims that the power of
13

Ibid.,73.
Nearly twenty-five years later (and five years after his death), Halbwachs’ Le Mémoire
Collective was published in English as The Collective Memory.
15
Ibid.,7.
16
Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1992), 22.
14
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collective memory resides in its ability to establish roots within social frameworks: a
collective memory endures when it resonates with social groups that stake a claim to it. If
we accept that memories change over time, then the power of collective memories must
depend on social groups (and their relative access to power) to provide continued support
for the “collective” memory that reinforces their view of the past.17
Similarly, although approached from a different perspective, individual memories
are also immediately shaped by a larger, more collective memory. As Halbwachs argues,
the way one remembers the past reflects the social group to which he/she belongs. In Las
Cadres, Halbwachs specifies some of these social groups as the family, the Church, and
most significantly socioeconomic class. 18 Two later memory scholars working in Latin
America and Spain respectively, Elizabeth Jelin and Paloma Aguilar Fernández, have
argued along similar lines. Jelin asserts that “individual memories are always socially
framed,”19 while Aguilar suggests that “individuals are able to recall the past precisely
because they belong to a social group. The interests and experiences of the group shape
the memories of its members and the very fact that they belong to the group helps them to
remember (by means of referral) and to recreate their own experiences collectively.”20
Halbwachs elucidates the symbiotic relationship between collective and individual
memories. He demonstrates that both kinds of memory subconsciously rely on social
frameworks. Whereas individuals depend on social groups to inform their personal
memories, collective memories rely on social frameworks to keep them alive. For
17

Ibid, 21.
Ibid..
19
Elizabeth Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory (Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 11.
20
Paloma Aguilar Fernández, Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War
in the Transition to Democracy (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 11.
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Halbwachs, social amnesia can occur when these social frameworks dissolve or break
apart.
Halbwachs’s third main argument is that memory is constantly revised because of
circumstances in the present. Halbwachs assumes a presentist perspective on collective
and individual memory, arguing that when we look back, we do not conjure up the same
past that we had originally perceived. Instead, our personal and collective reminiscences
go through a filter that refashions our memories based on the present. In other words,
memory is a reconstruction of the past from the vantage point of the present. In writing
about Halbwachs, Patrick Hutton succinctly observes “remembering, therefore, might be
characterized as a process of imaginative reconstruction, in which we integrate specific
images formulated in the present into particular contexts identified with the past.”21
But how does Halbwachs explain the difference between history and memory? If
memory is a social reconstruction of the past based on the present, what is the role of
history and historians? In La Mémoire Collective, Halbwachs argues that history and
memory are separate enterprises and retrieve two different pasts. Where memory is
whimsical and mystical in its ability to bring the past back to life with emotions intact,
history is more sterile and can only resurrect a past that has been stripped of its emotional
resonances. Halbwachs maintains, however, that it is the historians’ job to “keep memory
honest”22—history must fill in the gaps of the past that memory leaves behind. It can be
said then that Halbwachs saw the amalgamation of “objective” history and “subjective”
memory as the fundamental ingredients in the production of History.

21
22

Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, 78.
Ibid., 77.
21

Although a revitalized appreciation for Maurice Halbwachs’ work came years
after his death, several other French theorists have also contemplated memory within
similar contours. French philosopher Michel Foucault has garnered praise for his
contributions to the politics of memory. Although Foucault’s work focused more on the
rhetoric of commemoration than on memory, his argument that historical discourse
constantly evolves based on the present can easily be applied to the process of collective
memory. As the way in which we discuss the past is reconfigured because of the present,
so too is the way we represent the past, both in word and deed or commemoration, in our
memories. Foucault maintained that what may appear to be the past retrieved by
commemorative rhetoric is actually a representation of how society once “talked” about
the past. In this way, Foucault’s theory of historical discourse is akin to Maurice
Halbwachs’s argument of social frameworks and collective memory. For Foucault, the
reconfiguration of historical discourse relies on powerful social groups to promulgate the
myriad discursive representations of the past.23
Maurice Halbwachs and Michel Foucault centered their work on the internal
mechanics of memory. Both argued that memories are representations of a past that we
reconstruct based on the present. What Halbwachs and Foucault (and many others) first
suggested has since been applied, among others, by Pierre Nora (1931-

), a French

historian and perhaps the most preeminent contemporary scholar in the field. In Nora’s
most significant project, Les Lieux de Mémoire (1984-92),24 he and fifty other French
historians set out to understand why the French Revolution had ceased to represent the
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pinnacle of French political identity. This subject led Nora and his colleagues to question
more broadly where and why other French sites of memory had evolved to take on new,
more powerful meanings, thus eclipsing the Revolution. For Nora, imagining France’s
future required discovering where and how France had previously been represented in the
nation’s collective mentality. This meant passing through the “commemorative
monuments, shrines, national histories, civic manuals and history textbooks, public
archives and museums,”25 and concluding that the omnipresence of memory sites is a
product of the obliteration of living memory.
Nora opens Les Lieux de Mémoire with the essay “Between Memory and
History,” in which he lays out the conceptual framework that guided his project. He
argues that “there are lieux de mémoire, sites of memory, because there are no longer
milieux de mémoire, real environments of memory.”26 According to Nora, history has
diminished and destroyed living memories because of a need to organize them into
representations of the nation. Sites of memory, like monuments, museums, and textbooks,
exist because history has colonized our whimsical, precious reminiscences of what is no
longer. If it were not for the “conquest and eradication of memory by history,” there
would not be the need to continually commemorate the past—the constant need to
retrieve the irretrievable.27 Nora also argued, and this is critical for understanding the
function of memory both within the Southern Cone and more specifically within the
Chilean context, that the need to commemorate or catalog the past emerges during
moments of historical disruption or dislocation. As individuals, but more visibly, as
25
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social groups, we “return to the past” during periods of rupture, when history changes
course.
Like Halbwachs, Nora assumes what some might see as a particularly cynical
view of history. He argues that history is always the reconstruction of what once was,
while memory is our eternal link to the past, present, and future. But Nora’s critique of
history goes further. As he claims, “history’s goal and ambition is not to exalt but to
annihilate what has in reality taken place.”28 Yet given his provocative stance towards
history, Nora nevertheless acknowledges that the creation of lieux de mémoire makes
historians out of everyone. Every group within society feels a need to recreate its identity
by the reconstruction of its own history. So while it is history that destroys memory, it is
historiography—or the representation of the past (what one might designate as History,
with a capital “H”)—that in turn gives birth to sites of memory. The latter argument
applies to El Mercurio as many would say that the paper is both representative and
generative vis-à-vis memory. It is representative in that it reflects the way the Right in
Chile has constructed and revised its understanding of the past. But it is also generative in
the sense that El Mercurio itself has become a site that fashions a memory of the past.
For Halbwachs, Foucault, and Nora, moreover, the key concept towards
understanding the connection between history and memory is representation. The archive
of history resides not in actual events themselves (events which, in any case, we can only
access through representation) but rather in the way these events have been represented
and refashioned in our memories. Pierre Nora observes those representations in lieux de
mémoire whereas Michel Foucault focuses on the discursive practices that have

28

Ibid., 9.
24

reconceived our traditions over time. Despite different methods, the unifying core of their
work is a desire to understand where and how French identity has been represented in the
past in order to understand how French national memory will be constructed in the
present and future. Without doubt, contemplating why these three men theorized memory
specifically in the context of twentieth century France would be a thesis in and of itself.
But, building on the work of these French academics, the study of collective memory has
become an important field of analysis in the Southern Cone of Latin America where
countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and, Chile only recently emerged from long and
brutal periods of political and civil conflict.
Memory Studies in the Southern Cone and Chile
The study and understanding of memory in the context of Latin America’s
Southern Cone and Chile, specifically, is inextricably linked to the traumatic events of
repression and government terrorism of recent times. The scholarship of memory,
particularly collective memory, within the Southern Cone approaches memory largely
from the specific vantage point of a post-traumatic political reality, and sees its work as
intimately linked to rebuilding a truthful past and achieving justice for the victims.
During but particularly after the violent period of state repression known as the
“Dirty Wars” in South America, memory became a powerful and important means for
those who experienced personal tragedy to deal with their loss and suffering.29 While
“memory” has historically been one of the key ways politically marginalized or
suppressed groups have attempted to influence public opinion and historical
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consciousness, it became a particularly poignant outlet in countries like Argentina and
Chile where state repression most often took the form of “disappearing” political
opponents. The call to remember was a way of insisting both that the “disappeared”
person did exist –bodies could disappear, but not memories—and to ensure that such
atrocities “never happen again.”30 Groups of women in Chile and Argentina, in particular,
used their own inscribed memory (via photographs, kerchiefs made from diapers, and
other artifacts), and incorporated them literally on their own bodies, to keep the past
alive.31
Since the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship, the study of memory—particularly
collective and historical memory—has surfaced with even greater force as Chile’s
citizens both individually and collectively come to terms with a contentious and troubled
past. The historiography of memory in Chile is vast and includes the innovative work of
Elizabeth Jelin, Elizabeth Lira, Brian Loveman, and Steve Stern, among others.32 Their
work sheds light on why “memory” has become an arena of political struggle in Chile,
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and suggests why El Mercurio, in particular, is a central actor in the battle to engrave
Chile’s national history.
One of the most important memory scholars writing about the experiences of
nations in the Southern Cone is Elizabeth Jelin. In Los trabajos de la memoria (translated
as State Repression and the Labors of Memory), Jelin emphasizes that the periods of
government oppression in countries like Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile present a
whole new set of dimensions to the discussion of collective memory.33 What frames this
debate is that memory retrieves the past so as not to forget it, whereas in other
circumstances memory retrieves the past in order to relive or revive “what once was.”
Further, in the Southern Cone, as in other places that recently emerged from conflictladen pasts, memory is connected to the political challenges of the present, namely the
reinstitution of democratic government. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, memory
studies in cases of trauma present new intricacies because many of the groups and
individuals who experienced immense loss and suffering and many of those who inflicted
it, are still alive, often times living side-by-side. Memory in this case is a living (daily)
experience. In the context of Latin America’s Southern Cone, as Jelin keenly observes,
“there was no generational renewal, and the conflicts of the past were still part of the
‘lived experience’ of most actors.”34
In State Repression and the Labors of Memory, Jelin explores several conceptual
frameworks that I find particularly useful with regards to El Mercurio’s post-Pinochet
historical narrative. In reference to Maurice Halbwachs’s “cadres” or social frameworks,
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Jelin supports the claim that collective memory is a social construction; that memories
are more reconstructions than they are recollections. The way we as individuals
remember the past is a reflection of the social group to which we adhere. Jelin, however,
stresses the differences between the memory reconstructions of social groups of privilege
and those of dispossession or disadvantage. Because Jelin sees memory as a product of
struggle, she also accentuates the role of individuals within Halbwachs’ theory of social
frameworks in carrying out the “labors” of collective memory. As Jelin notes,
“[collective memory] calls for placing primary attention on the processes of development
and social construction of these memories.”35 Jelin insists that we bear in mind the
agency and active participation of individuals in the formation of and struggle for
collective memory. Similar to Halbwachs, Jelin argues that the way we reconstruct the
past in our minds is connected to present political conflicts. But Jelin’s presentism is
magnified by the political circumstances in the Southern Cone. As Jelin argues, for Latin
American nations emerging from dictatorships, the struggle for memory, to not forget or
become obstinate becomes linked to the struggle to reinsert democracy. For Jelin, part of
retaining a constitutional form of government involves the remembrance of the past in the
construction and acknowledgement of collective memory.
Given these underlying postulations about memory, one of the most salient
arguments in Jelin’s text is of the way in which struggles over the narrative of memory
occur. As “memory expresses itself in a narrative story which can be conveyed to
others,”36 Jelin suggests that different groups struggle in the public sphere so that their
memory narrative of the past becomes the truthful one, displaces the non-truthful one,
35
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and asserts its hegemony. In the context of the Southern Cone, memory struggles often
pit the narratives of those who have personally experienced repression against those who
see the establishment of authoritarian regimes as a salvation. As Jelin points out, there is
a need for those who have undergone loss and suffering at the hands of the state to
counteract the state’s “official history” by achieving hegemony over the past. This
argument directly relates to the work of El Mercurio in this period as it struggles in the
public domain to make its version of Pinochet’s dictatorship the “official” version—
Chile’s national history.
Jelin further argues that the root of a “hegemonic” narrative of the past resides in
the notion of a “master” narrative that stems back to the nineteenth century in Latin
America. These master narratives, according to Jelin, “serve[d] as a central node for
identification and for anchoring national identity.”37 In this way, what will be the
“official history” or “hegemonic narrative” of the dictatorial regimes in the Southern
Cone carries a lot of weight not just for how the past is remembered but also how postdictatorial national identities are constructed. Jelin reminds us that “the master national
narrative tends to be the story of the victors” and so the “memory” struggle surrounds the
ability of counter memory narratives to replace the state’s “salvation” narrative as the
official history.38 This point is again critical as the reader contemplates the power of El
Mercurio’s memory narrative to define Chilean post-dictatorial national identity and to
perpetuate the nation’s master narrative of unending democratic stability.
As a final note, Jelin offers some helpful reflections on the connection between
memory and history. While she argues that there is “no one way to articulate the
37
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relationship between memory and history,” she nevertheless suggests that history and
memory bear a mutual relationship. 39 As she says, “memory is a crucial source of
history” while history enables us to question and challenge memory.40 In the context of
the Southern Cone, memory struggles frequently occur around the representation of
conflict-laden pasts, pasts that are typically connected by a specific type of agency
expressed through human rights movements. Because of that, “the historian or social
scientist may under certain conditions become a public actor, and his or her positions visà-vis a particular conflict may have political consequences that extend beyond
disciplinary knowledge and academic debate.”41
Where Jelin makes broader statements about the collective memory of repression
in the Southern Cone, historian Steven Stern narrows in on the specific case of collective
memory in Chile. While Stern employs similar arguments for the salience of memory in
the Southern Cone, he notes that in Chile, the memory question is particularly significant
because of the social impasse seen in the country since the transition back to democratic
rule (a history capped off, as I suggested, by Allende’s shattered eyeglasses). For Chile,
the dichotomy of memory vs. oblivion fails to accurately encompass the myriad ways that
memory reaches the hearts and minds of Chileans. The memory struggles of Chile are, as
Stern claims, the struggles of those who “are seeking to define that which is truthful and
meaningful about a collective trauma,” not simply the struggle to remember so as not to
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forget.42 Stern argues that the paradigm of “memory against forgetting” should be revised
to reflect a struggle of memory against what he calls “obstinate” memory.
Although he works within the vein of collective memory, Stern’s theory of
emblematic memory, as set out in the first two volumes of his projected trilogy, The
Memory Box of Pinochet’s Chile, distinguishes his work from previous scholarship in the
field. Emblematic memory, as Stern defines it, is a socially constructed framework that
organizes personal memories of the past into a collective narrative as it simultaneously
imparts interpretative meaning to the past. For Stern, emblematic memory differs from
collective memory in that it isn’t just the fusion of similar experiences and memories into
a larger narrative but rather the acknowledgement by a social group of the essential truth
of that narrative. In other words “a framework of remembrance is emblematic because
many people have come to share the idea that it represents truth.”43
In Remembering Pinochet’s Chile on the Eve of London 1998, Stern identifies
four emblematic memories that he suggests have developed in Chile since the coup:
salvation, rupture, persecution and awakening, and the closed box. These particular
memory fields are not naturalized, i.e., they are not triggered by memories themselves,
but rather they represent the collective agency of portavoces (or as Jelin would call,
memory entrepreneurs) who struggle to keep their “truths” of the past in Chile’s public
imagination.
Like Jelin, Stern highlights the agency of individuals in social groups who
perform the labors of emblematic memory making. Stern labels concrete criteria for the
creation of emblematic memories, suggesting that tangible work is done and specific
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conditions—moments of rupture or conflict—are required to elevate “loose memories” to
the emblematic. In other words, moments of conflict provide the catalyst for social
groups to organize personal lore (personal experiences or memories) into an emblematic
narrative that reflects a collective truth. As Stern notes, “when the symbols and
consequences of a rupture are widely experienced by adults and youth as a ‘defining issue
or moment,’ the necessity to elaborate collective memory and meaning becomes more
powerful.”44 In Chile, one moment of rupture, the bombing of the Presidential Palace (La
Moneda), on September 11, 1973, has come to represent for some the annihilation of
Chile’s long-standing democracy (and with it the loss of a family member or close
friend), while for others, it is remembered as the truthful representation of Chile’s
salvation from Marxist subversion and civil war.
While Stern explores the emblematic memories of salvation and that of the
“closed box” that typically align themselves with supporters or sympathizers of
Pinochet’s regime, the bulk of his work regards counter-emblematic memory narratives,
those of rupture, persecution and awakening.45 Indeed this focus is not surprising or
unfounded given its connection to active, international human rights movements. The
question of conservative memory narratives in Chile, as previously mentioned, however,
remains virtually unexplored. As Stern and others demonstrate, the predominant
conservative narrative represents Pinochet’s government as having saved Chile from a
“Marxist Cancer,” while putting the country on the path of successful capitalist growth.
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But little research has been done to suggest whether this historical narrative has changed
over the period since Pinochet left the Moneda, a period of democratic government and
accumulating historical documentation on the dictator’s methods. To explore this
question, I examine one of the “memory entrepreneurs” active in the field of conservative
ideological production, El Mercurio. In the next section, I locate El Mercurio within a
broader historical context, highlighting the social and political circumstances that helped
lead to the democratic rupture on September 11, 1973.
Twentieth Century Chilean History:
Chile’s twentieth century was marked by intense economic fluctuations, social
transformations, and the expansion of democratic participation in the electoral and, more
broadly speaking, political process. For Chile’s Right, however, the decades leading to
the election of Salvador Allende in 1970 witnessed a continuation of traditional and
uninspired leadership. Despite an unprecedented increase of popular inclusion in politics
over the course of the twentieth century, the Right demonstrated a wooden determination
not to broaden its base of support outside of Chile’s powerful elites and the campesinos
(peasants) controlled by landlords in the countryside. In fact, it was not until the 1964
election of Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei Montalva, signaling the birth of a party
which could challenge conservatives from the center, that Chile’s traditional Right would
finally act to refashion its image and organize itself around a consolidated ideology
which was both anti-democratic, and anti-participatory even as they continued to contend
in the traditional electoral arena. By the time Salvador Allende stepped into office, a new
conservative force had officially arrived and was awaiting the right moment to reclaim
power from the Left and mount an authoritarian regime.
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Since the 1830s Chile’s government had operated within a fairly conventional
two-party structure (Conservatives and Liberals). From the outset, this set-up was notable
for its ability to channel the fight over resources into predictable (constitutional) outlets,
and because it allowed the country’s elites to exercise control over both parties. This
pattern, which became known as an acuerdo de caballeros (gentlemen’s agreement),
lessened political violence even as it marginalized the nascent social forces of the
twentieth century. Yet even the new parties on the Left that developed after the turn of
the century, the Communists and Socialists, parties which located their political base
within the newly emerging urban working class, remained within older political alliances
led by middle-class parties (Radicals). Conservative parties, as I have said, relied on a
loyal and consistent electorate within the country’s rural aristocracy and the peasants they
controlled, and among economic elites in the cities.
The ideology of this “Old Right” was characterized by the pursuit of its dominant
class interests rather than developing a political approach that would allow it to expand
its base of support. It more often sought strategic holds at the parliamentary rather than
presidential level and sought non-elite votes by using its economic clout in the cities and
tradition and intimidation in the rural areas. The Right thus stayed in power for most of
the nineteenth century by a clever combination of social inclusion, usually through
targeted marriages of important up-and-coming mining, and then industrial elites, or by
buying or bullying other electoral supporters.46 Yet by the turn of the century and the
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crushing blows dealt to Chile by both World War I and the U.S. stock market crash, it
was anything but fortuitous that Chile’s emerging social groups grew gradually
disillusioned with the Right’s elitism.47
The Build-Up to a Rightist Re-Orientation
The road to Allende’s 1970 election, and the birth of a “New Right,” arguably
began with the 1932 re-election of the patrician Arturo Alessandri, who had already
served one, shortened term as president from 1920-24. Alessandri became one of Chile’s
dominant elite families (his son would serve as president from 1958-64 and would
narrowly lose to Allende in 1970), largely because he recognized that Chile’s ruling class
needed to modernize its political base beyond the tactics of repression in order to gain
electoral control. His election in 1932 ushered in what came to be called the Compromise
State (estado de compromiso) which accepted the interventionist role the state would
have to play in the provision of social welfare and in the regulation of labor relations if
capitalism itself was to be stabilized in the midst of a world depression. The Compromise
State saw a renewed sense of “political bargaining between parties, a process of
industrialization, a slow but progressive consolidation of political democracy, increased
state involvement in the economy, and the establishment of a relatively open system of
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negotiation between organized workers and the entrepreneurial sector.”48 In many ways,
it marked the first moment in which Chile’s Old Right recognized the need to respond
and act according to the country’s political development—although the tradition of
buying or coercing votes, particularly in rural districts, didn’t actually cease until after the
1950s.
Still, the Right’s ability to adjust to a growing electorate and thus a changing
political atmosphere only went so far. As Simon Collier and William Sater note, “the
parties maintained (albeit within a broadening framework) much of the character that had
been theirs in Parliamentary times.”49 Thus, while the social conditions demanded
legislative reform, the conservative leadership that could have—and should have—helped
enact that change, remained aloof and primarily unresponsive. As I have suggested, it
was not until the watershed election of 1964 and the emergence of the Christian
Democrat Party to the forefront of national politics that the Right in Chile began to shift
its ideology and seek votes in new territory based on political competition, and not just
traditionally coercive methods.
The years following Arturo Alessandri’s second presidency up to the election of
his son, Jorge Alessandri in 1958 was one of competitive party politics and coalition
building. If one characteristic of the years between 1938-52 was an increase in the power
of Left-leaning parties, particularly the Socialists and Communists, who became regular
participants in “Popular Front” style coalitions that were led by the centrist Radical Party,
the other was the Right’s continued inability to appeal to those outside of its
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socioeconomic cohort or to find new leadership. The glory days of Chile’s elitist parties
(Conservative and Liberal) had passed as they showed “a continuing electoral decline in
the face of advancing centrist and leftist political groups.”50 Indeed, the Right’s two elite
parties would soon merge into one.
In the 1958 elections, the Right sought a tried-and-true candidate, settling, once
again, on Jorge Alessandri. They faced their most serious threat to date from a Left-center
coalition, the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP) led by a stalwart of the Socialist Party,
Salvador Allende, who had occupied the cabinet post of health minister in an earlier
coalition government. But a new centrist party, the Christian Democrat Party (PDCPatrido Demócrata Cristiano), would also diminish their vote, particularly in rural areas.
The Christian Democrats had a mixed heritage, a product of Chile’s Falangist Party (a
derivative of Franco’s party in Spain) and reform-minded social Christians. The PDC
would come to challenge the Left for votes among urban workers and the nation’s lower
classes, and the Right among the peasantry. Alessandri won the election by a razor-thin
margin (33,000 votes out of 1.2 million cast), but the election results suggested that the
“Hijo del Leon” (Lion’s Son) could not bail out the Right by using privilege and a
historic sense of entitlement to continue to win elections.51 The election of 1958 also, and
perhaps most importantly, marked the beginning of a political trend in Chile that would
continue until the coup of 1973: the emergence of a political order characterized by a
state divided into three political factions (right, center, and left), each able to command
similar numbers of voters.
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Alessandri’s economic agenda did not succeed in mitigating the country’s stark
socioeconomic disparities nor in addressing the high rates of inflation that began to
plague it. But his years in office did see an enormous increase in size of the working and
middle class electorate, which tended to strengthen the Christian Democrats and the Left
at the expense of the traditional Right parties.52 In the 1964 elections, the Right wouldn’t
even run a candidate, pressured by the U.S. Embassy to back the Christian Democratic
candidate, Eduardo Frei Montalva, for fear that the Socialist Allende, running for a third
time, would use a three-way split to his advantage.
The 1964 election was a watershed in Chile’s recent history. Magnified by the
Cuban Revolution of 1959 and a widespread turn in Latin America towards socialism as a
viable alternative, the election’s stakes were high and the campaign reverberated all over
Latin America. Within Chile, the newly mobilized middle and working classes voiced
increasing demands for social reform—particularly in the agrarian realm—and a statedriven, nationalist economic policy. Allende ran on a platform of vast political
transformation in order to put Chile on the path to socialism while Frei promoted
constitutional reforms without undermining “traditional freedoms.”53Although Allende
did better than in the previous two elections, gaining 39 percent of the votes, Eduardo
Frei won with a sweeping 55 percent. One of the more valuable lessons for the Right that
it could have derived from the election was that its best electoral chances would arise
from a coalition with the center. It was a lesson the Right ignored in 1970.
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To the extent that Frei’s center-reformist government increased the role of the
state in both the economy and social welfare programs at the same time that it threatened
conservative control of the rural areas through its agrarian reform legislation, the Right
became daily more alienated from Frei and the PDC.54 In 1966, in an attempt to halt their
slide, the Right’s two parties, Partido Liberal and Partido Conservador coalesced to
form the Partido Nacional (PN). As the key to the Right’s electoral success had long
been its iron-fisted control of the rural electorate, a control which was steadily eroded by
the PDC’s agrarian reform program, it realized that it would have to find a new
theoretical grounding, a central project, on which it could appeal to voters outside of its
elite circles. In this regard, the new party began to gravitate to one of its earliest heroes,
Diego Portales and what became known as “Portalian” politics. Portales, who never
served as Chile’s President, exercised virtually dictatorial powers from his various
cabinet positions in the early 1830’s. Conservatives credit him with quelling the postindependence anarchy in Chile, which he accomplished by brutal methods. He believed
in authoritarian rule until the time that Chileans might be “ready” for democracy.55
Having developed a considerable distrust of political parties and democratic governance,
the Partido Nacional began to call for a return to more authoritarian systems, suggesting,
as Portales did, that Chile was not yet ready for democracy. Marcelo Pollack pointedly
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observes that, “for the first time, [Conservatives] began to formulate a national project.
Its language adopted concepts of order versus chaos, of promoting the technical rather
than the political, of defending private initiative in the face of what they perceived as
growing state interference, and of a preference for political authoritarianism.”56 Inspired
by this nationalist fervor, the PN became an aggressive, anti-party force. Although the
Right’s rhetoric deliberately proclaimed an “anti-Left rather than anti-system stance,”57
the PN acted not merely out of its disapproval of Leftist and centrist state-led reform, but
from a fundamentally anti-democratic perspective. In other words, it was not just that the
PN would revolt against Allende’s socialist government when it won the 1970 election,
but that the “New Right” which had emerged out of electoral disappointments was
developing an ideology that rejected the democratic process (liberal democracy)
altogether.
The late sixties marked a time of widespread political action, increased dissent,
and optimism in Chile’s traditionally marginalized labor and working classes. As the
presidential election of 1970 approached, the Left and center-Left again turned to
Salvador Allende, now leading a newly formed Unidad Popular (Popular Unity)
coalition. Frei’s ultimate inability to solve Chile’s political and economic crises coupled
with a region-wide movement toward the Left reassured the Left coalition that their own
push for socialism was the correct one. The Christian Democrats, however, were more
uncertain of full-blown socialism in Chile. In the end, its candidate, Esteban Tomich,
represented the party’s left wing and argued for a kind of “socialism lite” program.

56
57

Pollack, The New Right in Chile, 28.
Ibid., 29.
40

A charismatic doctor turned politician, who preached “the democratic road to
socialism,” Salvador Allende offered an alternative of greater economic equality and
social justice. To Chile’s privileged sectors and foreign investors, particularly those allied
with the United States, the Unidad Popular represented the Partido National’s worst
nightmare. While the “New Right” had become a profoundly anti-democratic force,
Allende promised not only the deepening of democracy—via socialist reform—but the
dream of a pluralistic society no longer controlled by the elites, operating outside of and
against their long-standing acuerdo de caballeros.
With the Right failing to heed the lessons of the 1964 campaign, it forwarded its
own candidate, Jorge Alessandi, yet again, and the three-way split allowed Allende to slip
in with 36.3% of the vote (as against Alessandri’s 34.9%) on September 3, 1970. Because
neither candidate had won a majority vote, the final result would be determined by
congress, an opening which allowed the United States to covertly attempt to derail
Allende’s selection.58 When these measures failed in an embarrassing fashion, Allende
was confirmed as Chile’s president.
Allende’s election was an enormous victory for the Left, but it served as a
crushing defeat for the traditional Right, which, with the defeat of Jorge Alessandri, had
reached the end of its historical high-road. By the time Allende and the Unidad Popular
stepped into office in November 1970, it was the “New Right” elements of the
conservative movement that had already begun to articulate the challenge to Allende’s
Chile. If the Right was ever more eager to remove Allende and the Unidad Popular, it
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waited, however impatiently, for the right moment and proper support to do it. Despite
the PN’s emerging hostility towards the democratic institutions that had symbolized
Chile’s electoral history, a hostility that only fully coalesced when they could no longer
control those elections or guarantee their outcome, the Right understood that the military
would not act to oust him unless it felt that action would receive ample support, and that
required winning over the Christian Democrats to their side. At the start of the UP
government, harnessing Christian Democrat support proved difficult for the Right as both
Allende and the PDC “shared a strong commitment to representative democracy” and
social reform. 59 But by 1971, as Allende’s economic program (and the disruptions of a
covert U.S. economic blockade) began to produce “shortages, rising prices, and black
markets,” as well as the sense that there were political forces being unleashed by the
Popular Unity which were operating beyond the historic boundaries of elite control, the
PDC became ever more alienated from the UP. This process accelerated when centerRight factions in the PDC asserted their dominance. 60 The severance of UP/PDC
cooperation provided a window of opportunity for the Right to unite forces with the
Christian Democrats and mobilize its opposition movement against Allende.
By March 1973, Chile found itself in a state of social and economic chaos. With
Allende’s government blocked at every move by an opposition-controlled Congress, and
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their own supporters often acting autonomously, the president could not find a way out of
the skyrocketing inflation, massive protests in the streets, and surging violence between
the more militant UP supporters and adherents of the MIR (Movimiento de la Izquierda
Revolucionaria), on the one hand, and hard-core authoritarian supporters grouped in
Patria y Libertad, on the other. As the Right’s agenda became increasingly
insurrectional, Allende’s fate was sealed. On September 11, 1973, with the covert
encouragement of the Nixon Administration, the armed forces of Chile, led by General
Augusto Pinochet, staged a violent golpe de estado. 61
Framed around the notion of “restauración,” a “restoration” which stemmed back
to the 1830s, the military’s overthrow of the Unidad Popular led to the suicide of
Salvador Allende and what proved to be the collapse of Chile’s long-standing democracy.
Subsequently, Chile’s political Right and armed forces united in what was proclaimed to
be a “pronunciamiento”—a move to save the patria from civil war. Yet it would be a new
set of political actors, the ultra-conservative, ferociously anti-liberal gremialista
movement and a coterie of economists trained in monetarist theory at the University of
Chicago, who would provide the ideological orientation for the military dictatorship that
took shape after September 11th. And more, it would be the right-wing media
establishment, El Mercurio, which would lend its voice and authoritative support to this
most radical of deviations from Chile’s democratic traditions.
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El Mercurio: The Traditional Voice of Untraditional Politics
It is necessary to explain a bit of the historical background of El Mercurio in
order to understand why the newspaper is fundamental to the articulation of a
conservative historical vision in Chile, both during and, in this case, after the fall of
Pinochet’s dictatorship. Because of El Mercurio’s centrality in conservative journalism,
the historical narratives it has propagated since 1990 can point to the ways in which the
Right has collectively represented Chile’s past over time and how conservatives intend
that this contentious period in Chile’s history be remembered in the future.
For almost two centuries, El Mercurio has been considered Chile’s newspaper of
record. It is undeniably the country’s leading conservative media outlet. First founded in
1827 in Valparaíso by Pedro Félix but later re-located and reestablished in 1900 in
Santiago by Agustín Edwards MacClure, El Mercurio has since remained exclusively in
the hands of the Edwards family. Because of the extensive wealth and investments of its
publishers, and because of its location at the heart of conservative politics in Chile, El
Mercurio has acquired a degree of influence and power in Chilean society and politics
unrivaled by any other media source.62 How El Mercurio came to dominate Chilean
journalism—so much so that it became such a crucial element in catalyzing the
overthrow of Allende and supporting Pinochet’s dictatorship – is key in understanding
how the ideology New Right could gain such a popular foothold.
Emulating the concept of “objective” and “impartial” journalism as symbolized
by the London Times or the New York Times, El Mercurio63 early on garnered not only a
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substantial readership but also the coveted reputation as being “de la naturaleza
libertaria” [of a more objective nature].64 El Mercurio’s management recognized that in
order for the newspaper to be taken seriously within Chile’s middle and popular sectors
as a modern and objective press, it would need to abstain from establishing direct ties
with the country’s party Right. To this end, El Mercurio claimed to be not just a framer
of “public opinion,” which it most certainly was, but a “representante de la civilización
chilena” [representative of Chilean civilization], even as it simultaneously catered to the
interests of Chile’s ruling class.65 In other words, while El Mercurio maintained its
stronghold within elitist circles, it broadcast its image as an unswerving supporter of a
free press in a democratic society: it stood for the promotion of truth, for untrammeled
freedom of expression, and for an objective journalistic practice. One of the more
interesting aspects of El Mercurio is not just that it was able to claim objectivity while
still representing the interests of Chile’s dominant class – that, after all, is a claim that
many media outlets make -- but that it promoted itself as the very embodiment of Chilean
identity and civilization, claims that only the most ideological of media make.
Yet from its birth up through the tumultuous years of the 1960s, the discourse of
El Mercurio, in its news analysis as well as its editorial stance, was unquestionably
capitalist, technocratic, and socially conservative. Directed by the corporation Grupo
Edwards, El Mercurio’s fundamental loyalty resided with the country’s entrepreneurial
sector and, for a long time, with the leaders of Chile’s Old Right. With the amalgamation
of the Liberal and Conservative parties into the Partido Nacional and the mounting social
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reformist movement of the late 1960s, El Mercurio took on a more overtly political role.
Although leftist and student groups began to question its reportorial trustworthiness, El
Mercurio still insisted on its differentiation from the political parties of the Right. As a
result, it was able to promote a conservative ideology without undermining its status as
Chile’s most powerful and politically independent newspaper.66
With the election of Salvador Allende, however, El Mercurio shed its “detached”
image to become a vital player in the Right’s opposition movement. Unlike other
conservative outlets, El Mercurio had a unique ability to speak to centrist sectors of
Christian Democrats that had for so long trusted its “objective” and “impartial” reporting.
For that reason, alone, it would become an indispensable platform for the conservative
opposition as it mounted its movement to remove the UP.67 During the UP’s three years
in office, El Mercurio’s news articles, not to mention its editorial stance, reflected an
increasingly frantic anti-government tone, adopting a more sensationalist approach to its
reporting of Chilean politics. But, as we will see, El Mercurio was far more than a
propaganda machine. It would become the historical record – for a time, the only daily
record – of what happened during those years.
While El Mercurio was and remains Chile’s leading conservative outlet and
played an important role in the continuity of Pinochet’s brutal regime, this thesis is not
concerned with issues of journalistic objectivity. Rather, if we are to understand how
conservative thought in Chile not just recorded but represented the past in and for the
present, El Mercurio becomes a vital source. To borrow from Pierre Nora’s lieux de
mémoire, it can be argued that the archive of El Mercurio is a site of memory in Chilean
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society. It represents where and how the Right in Chile recalls and refashions its
memories of the past. As historian Steve Stern would suggest, El Mercurio is a “mirror of
the nation.”68 Keeping in mind El Mercurio’s central role in the formation of Chilean
conservative collective memory, we now turn to the reshaping of Chilean conservative
ideology during Pinochet’s dictatorship.
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Chapter Two: Pinochet in La Moneda: The Ideology and Practice of Authoritarian
Conservatism in Chile
September 11, 1973, the day that Chilean armed forces attacked and disposed of
Salvador Allende’s Unidad Popular (UP) government, marked a decisive break from
Chile’s long-running democratic tradition. Since its independence, Chile had prided itself
on sustained constitutional government and civilian rule. But on September 11, General
Augusto Pinochet and three other military chiefs who made up the ruling Junta began
systematically to decimate the democratic institutions that were the bedrock of Chile’s
political identity. September 11, 1973 not only symbolized the demise of “la via
democrática al socialismo” (the democratic road to socialism), it also foretold a death
threat to liberal democracy in general. The bombing of La Moneda, the presidential
palace, spoke loud and clear to those who would listen: politics in Chile was about to be
severely restructured. Over the next seventeen years (1973-1990), Pinochet’s military
regime fundamentally transformed Chilean political, economic and social life. As will be
discussed below, this entailed the widespread removal of many opponents of the new
regime and/or supporters of the UP by means of assassination, torture or exile, as well as
the marginalization of coup supporters who opposed the growing repression of the regime
and any opponents to General Pinochet within the Army. It also involved—and this is
where our subject, El Mercurio, becomes key—the production and dissemination of an
ideology which was politically authoritarian, socially conservative, and economically
monetarist, and the institutionalization of that ideology, most profoundly, through the
1980 Constitution.
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In order to discern how El Mercurio revised its historical narrative of Pinochet’s
regime in the post-dictatorial period (chapter three), one must first set the record straight
about what did happen between 1973-1990. The main target of the forces who carried out
the attack on La Moneda on September 11, 1973 was the Left, as represented by Salvador
Allende, those active in his governing Popular Unity coalition, and leftist forces outside
his government (the MIR). However, what developed under Pinochet’s rule was not
simply an attack on the UP, Leftists or those otherwise deemed “subversive” by Augusto
Pinochet and his secret police. Rather it was an attack on liberal democracy itself. In a
project that would later be called a “renovation” by El Mercurio, Augusto Pinochet and
the three members of his Junta set out to destroy the political institutionalism that had
existed in Chile prior to September 11, 1973. As such, Pinochet’s regime also targeted
(although in less brutal fashion) moderate political parties who came to oppose the
Junta’s methods (Christian Democrats, largely) and even the traditional conservative
parties because what they sought was a return to the status quo ante.
As we have seen, the years leading up to Salvador Allende’s election witnessed a
crisis within Chile’s traditional (“Old”) Right. By the time Allende assumed office in
September 1970, it was quite clear that the Right could no longer rely on its historically
privileged position to win electoral victories. Thus, while the late 1960s and early 1970s
saw the dawn of a new era in leftist politics, it had also led to a crisis in Chile’s
traditional Right. By September 4, 1970, and continuing throughout the three-year
government of Salvador Allende, various leaders from Chile’s traditional conservative
coalition began shaping the Right’s ideological rebirth. The overthrow of Allende in
September 1973 and the beginning of military rule—spearheaded by Pinochet, a man
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with no previous ideological ties to Chile’s “Old Right”— led to the emergence of a new
conservative agenda.69 During Pinochet’s regime—most notably in the decade between
the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s—it would be the “gremialistas” with their authoritarian
predilections, along with the Chicago school economists, who formed what has since
been referred to as Chile’s “New Right.”70
As Pinochet’s regime and the “New Right” had merged into a singular,
hegemonic force by the middle of his regime, how a new, dominant conservative
ideology unfurled, and how it was made manifest after 1973 is the focus of this chapter.
Yet if seventeen years of military rule oversaw the emergence of a “New Right,” it
concurrently created a significant ideological split in Chile’s conservative bloc. This split
ultimately centered on whether the Right would form itself around authoritarian
conservatism or attempt to reenergize a traditional democratic conservatism.
El Mercurio, for its part, not only flourished its rhetorical sword to help depose
Allende, but subsequently became the singular narrator of Pinochet’s regime and its neoliberal authoritarian ideology. Because El Mercurio served both as the producer and the
reflection of the new conservative forces in Chile, I will explore the paper’s role in the
generation of a new conservative project in Chile.
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The Coup and its Consequences:
The swooping planes with their deadly missiles launched over La Moneda on
Tuesday September 11, 1973 were only the beginning of what has been described as
Chile’s darkest hour. Although rumors of a threatened coup had circulated widely for
months (and one actual attempt that had been put down on June 29), few would have
predicted the level of chaos and violence that ensued on that fateful Tuesday morning.71
By the afternoon, Salvador Allende was dead and General Augusto Pinochet had seized
control of the country. 72 Over the course of the afternoon, all pro-government radio
stations had been forced off the air and the military’s voice alone resounded declaring the
Unidad Popular a failure—a crisis in the democratic tradition—and calling for the
restoration of civility in the country. By the evening, Pinochet and the three other
members of his Junta—Gustavo Leigh of the Air Force, José Toribio Merino of the Navy,
and César Mendoza representing the carabineros (a militarized police force)--appeared
on national television to present the objectives and policy of their regime. As
conservative political forces and other right-wing media outlets (especially El Mercurio)
had been preparing the country for months by promoting an image of a Chile in threat of
being overrun by a Leftist dictatorship, the Junta spoke of September 11 as a day of
salvation from Marxist dictatorship and civil war. General Leigh declared that the Junta
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would take all the measures necessary to rid the country of its “Marxist cancer,” save the
country’s economy, and return it to civilian rule.73
After the Junta’s first public address, few would have guessed that Pinochet’s
regime would last for seventeen more years, becoming the single longest government in
Chilean history. And certainly no one could have foreseen the degree of repression and
injustice committed by the Chilean state on its own people. Over the course of Pinochet’s
regime, more than 35,000 people were tortured, a documented 2,279 were killed (and it is
likely that many more undocumented deaths remain to this day uncounted), and tens of
thousands were sent into exile.74 The military regime, which began by exterminating its
real and perceived enemies, ended by formulating a new state.
Pinochet’s rule between 1973 and 1990 can be divided into three key periods. The
first period, which begins with the coup and extends to roughly 1975, entailed cleansing
the country of Marxism. The second phase (1975-1980), opened the move toward a new
institutionalism in Chile by consolidating the political and economic basis of Pinochet’s
regime. The final period, beginning with the implementation of the 1980 Constitution and
ending with the plebiscite of 1988, marked the full institutionalization of Pinochet’s
regime in both the economic and political spheres. This final period also witnessed the
deepening of political divisions within the regime’s supporters, which produced the
Right’s split into two main conservative parties, Unión Demócrata Independiente
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(Democratic Independent Union, UDI) and Renovación Nacional (National Renovation,
RN).75
The First Period: Repressive
The first phase of Pinochet’s government (1973-1975) was marked by clumsily
constructed decrees and widespread repression. Despite his plan to rid the nation of
Marxist influence, when Pinochet first assumed power, his regime lacked a coherent
driving ideology. In fact, most actions undertaken by the Junta in this first period were
deemed “emergency” measures designed to “cleanse” the country—politically, socially,
and economically—of any UP influence and to resuscitate Chile’s shattered economy.76
In the first several weeks of military rule, Pinochet systematically suspended or
fully eliminated the most important political and governmental bodies that characterized
pre-1973 Chile. Since he blamed democratic party politics for the crisis engendered by
the UP, Pinochet closed Congress, outlawed pro-UP political parties (and suspended all
others), asserted his control over trade union organizations and suppressed the main labor
federation, imposed a strict curfew, took control of mainstream media by either censoring
or disbanding radio, television and written press, and appointed military men as rectors of
Chile’s main universities.77
The early years of Pinochet’s rule were characterized by regime’s attempt to
remove those considered to be “enemies of the state.” From the onset, the Junta insisted
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“there [could] be no dialogue with [the] enemy, only elimination.”78 As reports, which
began to appear as early as October 1973 insisted, this meant the kidnapping, torture, or
assassination in clandestine detention centers of individuals who were suspected of
opposing the military or of sympathizing with the overthrown government. In November
1973, after those considered to be immediate threats had been removed, Pinochet
established the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA), a secret intelligence agency
led by Army Colonel Manuel Contreras and reporting directly to Pinochet, to continue
the “purification” of subversives in a more systematic fashion.79
While it was clear that the Junta would not tolerate a return to pre-1973 Chile, it
remained uncertain from the outset exactly how Pinochet would reform the country.
While most leaders of the Right remained supportive, at least regarding the elimination of
Marxism, the Junta’s lack of agenda led to internal political conflicts among its
conservative supporters, a divergence that foreshadowed future splits within the Right.
The first problem concerned how long military rule would last. Traditional sectors of the
Right and Christian Democrats who had supported the coup called for a relatively quick
return to civilian rule. Still guided by the historical practices of the “acuerdo de
caballeros,” the Partido National promoted the restoration of political parties and
electoral politics, although without the presence of Marxism. At the other end of the
spectrum were the autoritarios (authoritarians), comprised predominantly by Jaime
Guzmán and his gremialista followers who envisioned a complete transformation of
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Chilean society which could only be carried out through an extended period of dictatorial
rule.80 As we will see, this divergence, in many ways, was at the basis of two main
memory narratives of Pinochet’s years in power, the “restorationist” and the
“renovationist”.
In 1974, Pinochet issued the Junta’s first communiqué, the Declaración de
Principios del Gobierno de Chile (Principles of the Government of Chile). It addressed
the Junta’s governing principles, and indirectly spoke to its intention to stay in power for
a prolonged period of time.81 The Declaration also disclosed the growing influence of
Jaime Guzman and the gremialistas (analyzed below) in the national planning
organization, and therefore signaled that the authoritarian Right was emerging as the
leading voice in the military regime.82 In the Declaración, Pinochet evoked the spirit of
Diego Portales and imagined a return to what many Chilean conservatives suspicious of
democracy had long seen as Chile’s golden era, the period of authoritarian rule in the
1830s and 1840s that established a tradition of strong presidents, weak congresses, and a
silent public. He revealed that the Junta intended to reorganize the country’s economy—
and concomitantly its social system—to ensure the freedom of the individual from
government intervention. With the Junta’s intentions to remain in power publicly
disclosed, Pinochet moved toward the creation of an economic program to put its goals
into effect and a political strategy that could secure the stability it needed.83
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The Second Period: Consolidating Power
While the first several years had succeeded in destroying much of Chile’s
previously powerful social and political order, the second phase of Pinochet’s regime
(1975-1980) saw the consolidation of military rule under the auspices of a New Right
ideology. The years between 1975 and 1980 witnessed the emergence of a political
project which combined neoliberal economic policy (derived from University of Chicago
economists’ orthodox monetarism) with gremialismo, a political ideology which was
based on Catholic traditionalism and corporatist social doctrine. As I will explore below,
Pinochet’s political economic approach would translate to all facets of Chilean life and
serve as the basis of being Chilean, “chilenidad.”84 First, the economic model.
By the end of 1974, it was evident that the Pinochet regime’s initial efforts to
rescue Chile’s failing economy were not working. The worldwide recession led to a steep
decline in the demand for Chilean exports and inflation remained rampant. By this point,
the Junta was in desperate need of an economic program beyond emergency decrees and
the political measures needed to sustain it.85 As the regime’s supporters, in particular,
Sergio de Castro, a prominent economist at the Catholic University, continued to blame
the UP’s statism for the country’s financial crisis, Pinochet reached out to a group of
economists at the Universidad Católica for advice. These economists, nicknamed the
“Chicago Boys” because so many had received post-graduate degrees in the University of
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Chicago’s economics department, endorsed Milton Friedman’s philosophy of a “new
orthodoxy of monetarism and unrestrained laissez-faire” and were eager to apply such a
model to Chile.86 Completely opening Chile’s market to foreign influence and privatizing
all its companies seemed the first and most logical step in Pinochet’s plan. Soon the
Chicago Boys found themselves appointed as the Government’s top advisers and
economic ministers.87 As Brian Loveman pointedly notes, however, the Chicago Boys’
objective was not only to “rewrite the wrongs,” of the UP, but to “reverse the entire stateinterventionist trend that had developed in the 1920s.”88 It was clear that a neo-liberal
“restructuring” of Chile’s economic and social order was, in part, a reaction to the social
and political mobilization unleashed by the political accommodations set forth during the
“compromise” or social welfare, state.
Although the economy was deeply affected by a planned downturn in 1975, by
1976, the country’s inflation rate had receded and exports increased, giving the
impression that Chile’s financial crisis had begun to subside. Naturally, Pinochet and his
supporters were overjoyed. While the economic program would later crash on the hard
rocks of the recession of the early 1980s, its successes emboldened Pinochet and his
advisers to think more globally about the nature of the changes they could achieve in the
second half of the 1970s.

86

Ibid., 321. On Chicago economics in Chile, see Juan Gabriel Valdés, Pinochet’s
Economists: The Chicago School in Chile (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1995).
87
Pollack, The New Right in Chile, 62.
88
Loveman, Chile, 322; and Huneeus, The Pinochet Regime, 139-169, Chapter 5.
57

Gremialismo:
Since 1975, the Junta and its Chicago Boys adherents were actively planning a
new social framework where the dominant market relations within the economic sector
would be imposed upon social relations as well. It was Jaime Guzmán, the most
prominent supporter of gremialismo, who helped organize and articulate the political
vision to go with neoliberal economics. As Marcelo Pollack argued, neo-liberalism and
gremialismo “became the economic, ideological, and political pillars of the regime.”89
The main tenets and underlying philosophy of gremialismo are not easily
defined.90 As briefly mentioned, gremialismo’s roots can be traced to nineteenth-century
Spain where Catholic social dogma and nationalist ideas of “hispanism” were
experiencing a re-birth. By the mid-twentieth century, gremialismo had been deeply
influenced by Franco’s corporatist (“falangist”) project. In Chile, gremialismo found a
home with those in the Catholic Right, especially the prominent conservative historian
Jaime Eyzaguirre. Gremialismo moved out of its reduced intellectual circles during Frei’s
Christian Democrat government in the 1960s as it began to resonate with political groups
that had become increasingly distressed by liberal democracy. It surfaced as an influence
in the student movement of that time, under the intellectual leadership of Jaime Guzmán,
a law professor at the Catholic University’s Law School in Santiago.91
Somewhat ironically, gremialismo’s 1960s revival came from a desire to
depoliticize Chile’s university system and student politics, which, for a variety of
reasons, had become increasingly dominated by leftist parties. At the heart of
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gremialismo was a belief that all “intermediary” institutions – not just civil society forces
operating between the individual and the state, but economic institutions as well – must
operate autonomously in society, free from state intervention. These organizations,
gremios, had a natural right to organize themselves and realize their own objectives
independent from state control.92 According to gremialismo, the role of the state, then,
was solely to serve in the realms of foreign affairs and national defense.93
Gremialismo sees a strict hierarchy as the “natural” structure of society and in
practice favors the hierarchical authority of a strong leader, a carry over from its
conservative Catholic roots. In this societal structure, gremios, freed from state
interference, can establish their own agenda and realize their own goals. According to
gremialismo, because hierarchy maintains order it also fosters social harmony, and
because the interests of the individual supersede those of society, the state cannot impose
its agenda on man. Yet for gremialistas, because the rights of the individual trump those
of society, the social autonomy of gremios (the groups which connect these ontologically
superior individuals) must be maintained. The notion of social autonomy as envisioned
by the gremialistas is today most commonly referred to as “subsidiarity.”94
As stated above, gremialismo re-emerged shortly after the 1964 election of
Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei. But it flourished during Allende’s government as
Jaime Guzmán was among the UP’s most vociferous opponents. In the months preceding
the coup, gremios (everything from truck owners’ organizations to the professional
associations of doctors) and the Movimiento Gremial de la Católica (Gremial Movement
92
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of the Catholic University) constantly attacked Allende by organizing strikes and
boycotts that publicly defied the government. Indeed, gremialismo’s ability to reach out
to a worried middle class and its increased involvement with the right-wing opposition
movement helped fashion Allende’s demise.95
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the gremialistas became key proponents
of the authoritarian position, advocating for the institution of a new “protected”
democracy in which their views of society would be fostered. However, although
Pinochet had appointed Guzman to his most important national planning committee,
during the first several years of his rule, gremialismo remained restlessly in the regime’s
shadow.
Consolidating the Right:
It was not until well into Pinochet’s regime, particularly after the first repressive
period, that Guzmán and his main adherents fully embraced the Chicago Boys’ approach
to economic neo-liberalism. While both movements maintained an anti-interventionist,
depoliticized approach to government, Pinochet’s “Chicago Boys” and their neo-liberal
counterparts were unrelenting in their belief that it was “the responsibility of individuals
to defend their freedom rather than the gremio.”96 This naturally clashed with the
gremialistas who were hesitant to merge with the neo-liberalist program for fear that it
might dilute their own approach. However, as the first phase of dictatorship came to a
close still lacking a political agenda that could rationalize both the junta’s “emergency”
actions and the fact that Chile’s economy remained fundamentally weak, the gremialista
concept of “subsidiarity” helped justify the dismantling of the state apparatus which both
95
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gremialistsas and neo-liberals wanted, even though, in the end, it did not retain any
protection for the “intermediary” groups which the gremialistas defended.97 Thus for
their part, the gremialistas abandoned the more strident aspects of their corporatist
agenda and recognized that neo-liberalism could provide “a monumental opportunity to
carry out the political and social elements of their ideology.”98
By 1975/6 and as the economic “shock” policy sponsored by the economists had
finally started to spur economic recovery, it was clear that the neo-liberals and the
gremialistas had finally settled their differences and converged. A neo-liberalized
gremialista model which promoted a market-driven vision of both economic and political
society had replaced the gremialistas’ historical vision of conservative corporativism as
the Junta’s political project.99
By 1977, with both the gremialistas and the neo-liberals on board, Pinochet began
to take steps to legally ensure the permanence of a new, projected institutionality. In the
Plan de Chacarillas which he issued later that year, Pinochet would reveal the regime’s
intent to institutionalize its political and economic initiatives. Although he had not
spoken to what would take the place of Chile’s historic liberal democracy, Pinochet
nevertheless announced that the Junta would facilitate a transition back to civilian rule.
The Plan de Chacarillas helped deflect pressure from Junta supporters who wanted a
quick return to civilian rule, but it was vague in its time-table and in detailing exactly
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what steps would be taken to move toward civilian rule or what that rule would look
like.100 The regime’s opponents, for their part, remained skeptical of Pinochet’s plans, but
the economic boom of 1978-9 helped Pinochet garner widening support among his elite
allies. Indeed, the macroeconomic successes of the neo-liberal program (particularly for
the elites) led the Chicago Boys to stake claim to a “Chilean Miracle.” In their eyes, no
other country had such a successful economy. As 1979 came to an end, Pinochet
carefully prepared the country for a new decade of military rule. His first step: the
Constitution of 1980.101
Third Phase: From Constitution to Plebiscite
By the beginning of the 1980s, Pinochet’s regime, having consolidated its
ideological framework, focused its energy on deepening its permanent hold over Chilean
society. Pinochet and his closest advisors began drafting a new Constitution that would
stipulate the conditions for a “new Chilean democracy.” While Jaime Guzmán and the
gremialistas assumed a leading role in this, the Chicago Boys, focused on a set of
pervasive social reformulations (known as the “seven modernizations”) which included
the privatization of social security as well as reforms in the areas of education, health
care, agriculture, and justice. With the “modernizations,” the Chicago Boys would move
toward their goal of depoliticizing and privatizing many aspects of Chile’s political, as
well as economic, society.102
In the political arena, the emerging Constitution was met by dissent within Chile’s
conservative bloc. In particular, the disagreement concerned questions of the transition
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away from military control as well as provisions for voting in the new system. The
gremialistas remained critical of the concept of an expanded electorate characteristic of
universal suffrage models both for ideological reasons and because they feared the
revival of pre-1973 politics when Marxists could win power electorally. To this end, they
proposed a drawn-out transition period in which their political beliefs could be fully
enacted. They promoted the notion of a “democracia protegida” (protected democracy) in
which the military would play a central role ensuring the stability of the homeland and
while implementing the institutions embedded in the new Constitution. On the other
hand, more traditional sectors of the Right stressed a quicker return to party politics and
the re-implementation of a broad electoral system. In their eyes, democratic rule entailed
the freedom of the individual to elect representation at all levels of government. Like
other indicators, this division on transition politics and electoral schemes foretells the
eventual split between the two contemporary right-wing political parties, UDI and RN. 103
Despite the differences, on September 11, 1980 exactly seven years after he first
assumed control, Pinochet saw his Constitution ratified (even if in a suspect plebiscite,
given that no electoral rolls existed when the voting occurred). The passing of the 1980
Constitution offered Pinochet not only a means of legitimizing his massive
transformations, but also the opportunity to guarantee the legal basis of his rule for at
least a decade, and possibly almost two decades. The Constitution decreed that Pinochet
would remain President of Chile until 1989 when a plebiscite would be conducted to
determine his (potential) extension in power until 1997.104 The Constitution stipulated
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that electoral votes would count towards the election of the President and two-thirds of
the Senate seats while the remaining one-third of the Senate would be automatic
appointments. Two of the most controversial aspects of the Constitution were Articles 8,
which made “class struggle” illegal and removed their political rights, and Article 24
which declared the military as the ultimate arbiter and protector of the newly restored
chilenidad.105 Other articles gave a “Security Council” made up largely of the military
and its allies the right to lawfully intervene in the political process.
In March 1981, the Constitution of 1980 became the official law of the land, and,
as such, the date needs to be recognized as the “high water” mark of Pinochet’s regime.
But the next several years would nonetheless see a sharp decline in the credibility and
legitimacy of Pinochet and, especially, his economic policy. The worldwide recession of
1982 led to a drastic decrease in the demand for Chilean exports. For a country that was
completely dependent on foreign investment, this had devastating effects. As worldwide
prices plummeted, domestic production dropped and inflation again began to rise
precipitously. As Chile’s citizens, even those in the upper classes, began to feel the
effects, and as it became clear that many of the free market reforms had simply opened
the way for strategically placed financial groups to consolidate larger market shares for
themselves, Pinochet and the Chicago Boys’ reputation diminished. Despite its efforts to
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ignore the flaws in its free-market reform, ultimately the regime did what it had
foresworn and intervened economically by devaluing the peso.106
1983 to the Plebiscite
Ten years after the overthrow of Allende and the installation of military rule,
Pinochet’s regime could no longer ignore or repress a growing opposition not only from
the Left but even from certain sectors of the Right. Further, with the economic crisis of
1982, even some prominent elite allies had become alienated from Pinochet and his
prized neo-liberal reforms.
In August 1983 Pinochet opened conversations with some of his more moderate
allies to devise a transfer of power that, he hoped, would maintain the security and
integrity of his political project. While still adamantly opposed to a full reemergence of
political parties, Pinochet, nevertheless, began talks with the democratic opposition and
conservative leaders to “replace the neo-liberal economic team with a more pragmatic
and flexible group.”107 He appointed the moderate nationalist, Serigo Onofre Jarpa, a
former Partido Nacional Senator, as interior minister, with hopes that he would mediate
the growing political tension. Yet it became clear that the two blocs were unyielding in
their positions and despite modest efforts from actors on both sides, they could not reach
political consensus.108
In the midst of a generalized and growing political opposition, all factions of the
Right faced the decision of whether they would continue to “associate with the military
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regime and [with] Pinochet himself.”109 This question, however simple it may appear,
generated no simple answer or solution. In fact, it is precisely the Right’s inability to
reconcile its perspectives of Pinochet, the man and his project, that has become the
defining characteristic of conservative politics in Chile. As the end of the transitional
period loomed, the Right had to decide how to prepare for the revival of party politics.
For seventeen years, regardless of its internal divisions, the Right had maintained the
privileged position to dictate national politics. Now it would have to confront the
“possibility or impossibility of preserving the model and regime with a leadership
different from that of Pinochet.”110 Would it organize as an authoritarian force that
operated within a democratic framework, or would it re-embrace liberal democratic
politics and define a new conservatism accordingly?
One of the other main things to note about the split in the Right is that its
divergence and inability to reach consensus regarding Pinochet was not a reflection
simply of how its factions stood in relation to Pinochet’s actions during his dictatorship.
It was also a result of the different ways the two Right parties which emerged envisioned
Pinochet’s dictatorship within Chile’s broader history: as a period of democratic
continuity—and therefore consistent with the longstanding conservative master narrative
of Chile, or as a rupture in Chile’s democratic history which needed to be attended to?
The way these two parties understood the meaning of Pinochet’s dictatorship would
speak to the way each would construct a vision of the past that could serve in the postdictatorship contest for power.
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To the extent that it was unable to reach a political agreement in the years
preceding the presidential plebiscite of 1988, the Right had dissolved into several defacto parties.111 Yet it wasn’t until the internal elections of 1988 that differences hardened
and the factions officially split into two distinct parties: UDI and Movimiento de Unidad
Nacional (National Unity Movement-MUN, later the RN). Although it was established in
August 1983, by the latter half of the ‘80s, the Union Demócrata Independiente (UDI)
became the most influential party within the Right. With Jaime Guzmán as its leader,
UDI primed to become Pinochet’s heirs. From the outset, the party emphasized the
deepening of neo-liberal relations and the consolidation of corporatist conservatism. UDI
was loyal to all conditions set forth by the Constitution of 1980 and felt that it was its
responsibility to protect and carry out the country’s new institutional order. On the other
hand, the (MUN), precursor to Renovación Nacional, advocated dialogue with the
opposition and welcomed the notion of political liberalization. The MUN/RN, with
Sergio Onofre Jarpa and Andres Allamand as its main leaders, was seen as the
descendent of the traditional Right’s Partido Nacional. Indeed, both men had been active
in the PN’s leadership. While it was supportive of the last fifteen years of military
government, it could nevertheless look somewhat critically at the actions taken during
Pinochet’s regime—particularly surrounding human rights. As a result, Renovación
Nacional (as it became by 1988) “became the only right-wing movement to contemplate
a future without Pinochet”.112
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The transitional articles of the Constitution of 1980 stipulated that the military
would put forward one candidate to stand for election in 1988 in a Yes/No vote. While
some in the Right thought Pinochet was not the best candidate given the rise in popular
disapproval, they were overridden by the general who insisted on standing for election,
presenting the center-left opposition with a blatant target and the Right with a crucial
choice. For some on the Right, a YES victory would validate the last fifteen years of
Pinochetista rule and ensure its completion over the next decade. In addition, a win for
Pinochet (and his UDI supporters) would mean that Guzman’s party could further
develop its ideology and organize authoritarian principles within the framework of a
civilian system. For Renovación Nacional, the plebiscite campaign sparked division.
Some key players from RN joined the YES campaign while others, including the up-andcoming Sebastian Piñera, who trained in economics at the Universidad Católica and went
on to become a billionaire based on his successful introduction of credit cards into the
Chilean economy, worked toward a NO victory. From their perspective, a loss for
Pinochet would mean that the RN could run its own candidate in the forthcoming
presidential elections.113
As the plebiscite date approached, what remained beyond a doubt was the
impending opportunity for political forces that had been bottled up for 17 years to reemerge. This meant notable changes in the ways in which Chileans who had been
disenfranchised since 1973 would reconnect to the political system. In this context, it also
suggested that the media, those who represented the political life of the nation to large
numbers of people, could re-fashion their ideological positions in a new political
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framework. In the months leading up to the plebiscite, as it would once Pinochet finally
left La Moneda, the media became increasingly important in determining the meaning of
both the past seventeen years of Pinochet’s rule and of the transition as it unfolded in the
present. For the Right, this task lay in the hands of El Mercurio, not only because it
played the privileged role of publishing while other media sources had been shut down,
but because, in its role as a spokesperson for the Right, it had in the past provided a
unified conservative perspective.
El Mercurio Before and After September 11, 1973:
El Mercurio, as we saw in the first chapter, has long been Chile’s newspaper of
record, and this continued from a privileged position under Pinochet.114 Although over
the last several decades, other news sources had emerged as Pinochet lessened his
censorship rules, El Mercurio nevertheless maintained its status as Chile’s most
important and influential media source.115 El Mercurio, however, is not just a shaper of
public opinion; it refers to itself as the “representative” of “Chilean civilization.” In other
words, El Mercurio not only informs the public in a particular way, it also claims itself to
be the agent with enough cultural authority to determine what it means to be Chilean.
Guillermo Sunkel put it best when he argued, “El Mercurio never defines itself within the
context of any class-based interests, but rather within a national context, a context of the
general good, of the moral values which underpin the unity of the nation.”116 In short, for
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its owners and editors, how the country is represented in El Mercurio is how the country
actually is.117
It might be argued, then, that El Mercurio possessed the power to write a
particular vision of the nation into existence, even more so when it was the only
mainstream publication allowed to publish in the aftermath of Pinochet’s coup. Benedict
Anderson has argued in his influential work that the nation—which he characterizes as an
“imagined community”—came into being in chorus with the rise of print culture. He
suggests that the latter helped generate the nation in so far as print can connect dispersed
individuals within a shared political community. Newspapers, as Anderson says,
“provided the technical means for ‘re-presenting the kind of imagined community that is
the nation.”118 While Anderson’s work has been critiqued and supplemented, it
nevertheless offers important insights as regards print media’s ability to foster a particular
vision of this imagined community, which is certainly the case with El Mercurio.
El Mercurio has been increasingly analyzed since the return to civilian rule in
Chile in 1990. A documentary entitled “El Diario de Agustín” has recently been released
in Chile to critical acclaim and numerous theses on the paper have been published at the
Universidad de Chile.119 Scholars are focusing on El Mercurio as one of the main social
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and cultural agents during the dictatorship. 120 El Mercurio’s complicity with a regime
that has largely been condemned internationally for its human rights violations is being
re-examined. Even though El Mercurio has yet to acknowledge its one-sided support for
the Pinochet regime, the paper’s journalistic flaws—its lack of integrity, its
misinformation vis-à-vis the arrested and disappeared, has been increasingly
scrutinized.121 Those are important studies, but my own work focuses not on the
newspaper’s moral stance vis-à-vis the Pinochet government, but rather on its role as
arbiter of national identity, how it has represented chilenidad to the nation, both during
Pinochet’s years in power, and most importantly, after he left Chile’s presidential palace.
Understanding El Mercurio’s historical memory narrative will help us to understand how
those who not only tolerated but supported Pinochet’s brutal regime saw themselves as
acting within a particular narrative.
Some of the most interesting work on El Mercurio suggests, following the broad
lines of Gramscian theory that “the mass media can take on, in specific political-
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ideological contexts, the functions of a political party.”122These studies maintain that at a
certain point—and some will argue that it begins at the height of the Compromise State—
El Mercurio stopped operating as an impartial and independent paper, supportive of the
ideals of liberal democracy. 123 Instead it began to espouse authoritarian ideals and
diffused them, because of its history and status in society, as if it were a political party
working to bring its readers to action, in this case, against Salvador Allende and his
Popular Unity coalition. El Mercurio thus became a central player in the political
struggles of the times, leading its editors to no longer see their task as presenting a
conservative alternative in their editorial or informative sections, but rather to participate
in the “councils of state” of the Right intended to hasten Allende’s political demise. 124
A number of social historians have argued that El Mercurio, for most of the
twentieth century, filled an ideological vacuum which existed among conservative forces.
As one historian put it: “Given that the Chilean Right historically has not counted on the
presence of important ‘intellectuals,’ their role has been filled by specific organizations
and institutions, among which the mass media have played a central role.”125 This
observation speaks to the key role played by the media, and El Mercurio in particular, in
generating conservative political ideology. Since El Mercurio was the foremost outlet for
the traditional Right, it was able—and at a certain level expected—to develop a political
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discourse that more closely resembled that of a political party. Guillermo Sunkel agrees,
arguing that El Mercurio not only articulated the concerns of the Right but helped it
shape its ideology, even more so when Allende was president.
During the three-year UP government, El Mercurio began to “educate” its readers
about the perils of Marxism. While its rhetoric became more insurrectional in the latter
half of 1973, still, for most of Allende’s government, El Mercurio condemned Allende
as “totalitarian,” using its media platform to denounce the UP for depriving it of freedom
of expression, which was paramount for a free society. It was also during this period that
the paper began to redefine the how it thought about democracy—or at least what
democracy was not: Allende’s brand of socialism. But a crucial component of El
Mercurio’s discourse between 1970-73 was what Claudio Durán has named its
“incitement propaganda” (propaganda de agitación).”126 Durán argues that El Mercurio’s
agenda was not only to identify the government as an “enemy,” but to incite the
opposition into action. Durán employs the phrase “Imagen Angustiosa del Mundo” (“The
Anguished Image of the World” - IAM) to elucidate how El Mercurio helped create a
visceral climate of fear in Chile. As he argues, El Mercurio depicted Chile and the world
as existing in a state of chaos and disorder. Not only did the paper highlight everything
from natural disasters to delinquency and international instability, but it did so in a way
that placed the blame for all these crises on Marxism. El Mercurio used the frame of the
IAM to lend weight to the argument that “Chile [is] sick” and that “The Popular Unity,
controlled by Marxism, is incapable of making the country work and has produced an
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economic crisis.”127 In this way, El Mercurio blamed (international and local) Marxism
for any disorder and affirmed that the ideology cannot do anything to rectify its mistakes.
Durán suggests that the IAM was one of five other frames employed by El Mercurio in
the period between 1970-73 when it delivered its news: (1) the primacy of order; (2)
Marxist violence; (3) attacks on democracy; (4) the UP’s incompetency; and (5) the
international bankruptcy of Marxism.
In the period prior to the overthrow of Allende, El Mercurio helped formulate the
“salvation” narrative, which Pinochet and his supporters later used to frame the coup and
rationalize military governance. But El Mercurio also played a crucial role throughout
Pinochet’s seventeen-year rule. As it was mentioned before, once the Junta assumed
power, Pinochet, disbanded all forms of media that were sympathetic to the UP. El
Mercurio, however, remained open and was converted into the Junta’s privileged media
outlet.
In so far as it was, at least for a short period, the only paper to continue
publishing, El Mercurio ideology further reflected the Junta’s agenda. As Marcelo
Pollack writes:
During the Pinochet years, El Mercurio became the principal
instrument of information and ideological direction of the different
factions which constituted the ruling social and political bloc.
While television and radio, which reached over 80 percent of the
population, functioned as a means of communication for the
popular sectors, El Mercurio performed the function of orienting
and ideologizing the classes which adhered to it. While television
tended to act as an instrument of cultural indoctrination over the
masses, the written character of this long-established daily
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validated it as an ‘oracle’, all knowing and all-powerful, like the
Bible.128
Still operating as an “educator” of the “ruling class” El Mercurio, particularly in
the first period of Pinochet’s regime began to promote the need to “take apart the
traditional political apparatus.”129 Instead of redefining democratic ideals—as was the
case in the 1970-73 period—El Mercurio’s rhetoric became noticeably antidemocratic.
As Sunkel notes, El Mercurio began to advocate for “an extraordinary, even radical,
solution”—encouraging the destruction of the traditional mechanisms used to mediate
civil and political society. It must be noted that the confluence between when El
Mercurio became literally the only print media allowed after the coup and its decision to
promote an authoritarian model of government is significant and highly consequential.
This shift is even more notable given El Mercurio’s former orientation of supporting the
“free press” as the only mechanism for “saving” democracy (under Allende).
Throughout Pinochet’s regime, El Mercurio—its discourse and ideology—helped
shape and promulgate the Junta’s neo-liberal project. But on a deeper level, El Mercurio,
began to refashion Chile’s history by projecting an image of the Junta as the natural
inheritors and protectors of chilenidad. Guillermo Sunkel highlights this as he notes, “the
second important element of the political discourse of the period lies in presenting the
Military Junta as the representative of a “historic effort” (gesta histórica) which was
carried on over a long and difficult period in order to achieve Chile’s sovereignty.”130
Thus while El Mercurio was an agent of the Junta’s neo-liberal agenda, its most crucial
service to Pinochet was to historicize him—to place him and his government in a
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particular historic framework and (eventually) to organize his legacy. El Mercurio,
“actively participate[d] in the construction of [Pinochet’s] Historical Memory” even
before Pinochet ha[d] left the Moneda.131 As we will see in the next chapter, El
Mercurio’s ability to re-insert Pinochet’s dictatorship into a longstanding narrative of
Chilean democracy continues into the post-dictatorship period.

Chapter Three: El Mercurio —Re-Shaping Conservative History and Memory after 1990
In this chapter, I explore the development of El Mercurio’s shifting historical
memory narrative of the years 1970-1988 as it is constructed in the post-dictatorship
period. To be sure, a study of El Mercurio’s daily output over the 1970-1988 period is
central to analyzing any study of its larger representation of the dictatorship. But as
Sunkel and Durán demonstrate (see chapter two), many have already interrogated this
period. Rather, my central focus is on the changing ways El Mercurio, via its editorial
and news articles, represents Allende’s government, the coup of September 11, 1973, and
especially Pinochet’s seventeen-year rule, after Pinochet leaves the Moneda. By using a
close reading of the texts, this discursive analysis seeks to elucidate how the selfproclaimed “referente de la civilización Chilena” [“interpreter of Chilean civilization”]
re-interpreted and revised Chile’s recent history. It does so by analyzing the ways El
Mercurio, between 1990-2004, inserted the Pinochet dictatorship into what historians
refer to as a “whiggish” narrative of these troubling years. The narrative that emerges
from El Mercurio’s writers and editors insists that rather than a break in Chile’s
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democratic past, the Pinochet dictatorship is best understood as an attempt to strengthen
democracy itself.
Before exploring El Mercurio’s emerging revisionist account that began to take
shape after the departure of Pinochet from La Moneda—a narrative that seeks to define
how society should remember the dictatorship – it is critical to keep in mind what a wide
variety of national and international sources have confirmed about the reality of
Pinochet’s years in power. These sources have demonstrated (usually using fairly
conservative metrics) that during Pinochet’s 17-year long dictatorship, approximately
3,000 people died from political violence, the vast majority state-led, and there were over
40,000 cases of Chileans tortured or abused.132 To put these figures into a comparative
framework, the 3,000 Chilean deaths would be equivalent to about 40,500 deaths in the
United States and more than a half a million confirmed cases of torture. Beyond these
atrocious human rights abuses, Pinochet took a variety of measures to militarize the
Chilean state and decimate the country’s previous democratic institutions. His regime
closed Congress, insured the compliance of a supine judicial system, outlawed the parties
which had made up the Popular Unity coalition and suspended all others, established new
controls over trade union organizations, imposed strict curfews at will, took control of
mainstream media by either censoring or disbanding radio, television and written press,
appointed military men as deans of Chile’s main universities, and dismissed most social
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science faculties.133 From these hard historical facts one observes that life in Chile
between 1973 and 1990 was undeniably undemocratic.134
Yet during the first fourteen years of restored civilian government (1990-2004),
and even as its discourse incorporates a “counter-memory” that human rights abuses did
occur, El Mercurio will nevertheless present a narrative of Pinochet’s dictatorship that reinscribes it as a time of progress towards the achievement of a “true” Chilean democracy.
The post-dictatorial period reveals how Chile’s most influential conservative media voice
worked to re-insert what was, by all conventional standards, not just a serious breach of
democratic practice but a rule so reviled that Pinochet has become almost metonymic for
dictatorship itself, back into a narrative of democratic progress.135
This chapter, then, illustrates how El Mercurio has been able to paint a picture of
a past that is, in so many respects, the opposite of what it actually was. In El Mercurio’s
narrative, Allende, a democratically elected President, will be converted into a dictator
and his Unidad Popular into a totalitarian government while the Pinochet dictatorship
will emerge as a revolution of democracy and freedom. Yet much is at stake with
inscribing such a positivist interpretation of Pinochet’s dictatorship. Despite turning
history on its head, El Mercurio’s ability to insert Pinochet’s regime into Chile’s master
narrative of unending democracy suggests, in a troubling fashion, that neither it nor the
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conservative political forces it represents offer a sincere critique of the dictatorial period.
More distressing, this suggests that if the individuals who were complicit with or
responsible for the vast number of human rights abuses between 1973-1990 can, after the
fact, re-write the history of human suffering into a period of democratic progress, then its
leaves the way open in the future for a repeat performance.
El Mercurio’s approach to the production of a positivist, post-Pinochet Chilean
history is not original in relation to Chile’s longer historiography (see Introduction). Yet
the newspaper’s ability to do so in the post-dictatorial period given the empirical
challenge that Pinochet’s dictatorship presents, merits further investigation. Why has
writing the history of this period been so fraught that, over the last eighteen years,
different sectors of society have waged battles to define how this laden past will be
remembered? As stated above, to the extent that the coup of 1973 and Pinochet’s
dictatorship is certainly the most contested period in contemporary Chilean history, the
pulls of “history” and “memory” contend to shape not just the meaning of this period for
the present, but the meaning of the past in the present, how the past is made to matter to
those who learn of it.136 As the years between 1973-1990 represent a recent past, issues
of personal and collective memory conflate as individuals who actually lived the past
contest their memories to emerging “historical” interpretations. Further, Pinochet’s
dictatorship signified an exceedingly painful moment in the lives of many Chileans. Due
to the nature of the repression, particularly his regime’s use of “disappearances,” many
families and friends have yet, over thirty-five years later, to uncover the fates of their
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loved-ones. Finally, to produce an historical narrative of Pinochet’s regime is to
constitute Chile’s national history. As with most national histories, the stakes of
inscribing a narrative of Pinochet’s dictatorship are extraordinarily high because it will, at
a certain level, not only help to define a Chilean post-dictatorial political identity, but also
frame a revision of Chile’s historical past. 137 These are the challenges to writing the
history of Chile’s recent past and help explain why, in particular, it is useful to observe
closely the way in which one active participant allied with the dictatorship, El Mercurio,
has constructed a narrative of the Pinochet dictatorship from the vantage point of the
post-Pinochet years.
In the post-dictatorship period, El Mercurio’s political and cultural influence has
waned somewhat. As the years of the dictatorship wore on and eventually ended, El
Mercurio’s monopoly grip on the print media in Chile declined as other print sources,
and then competing TV, and, ultimately, internet news outlets emerged. Additionally,
nearly twenty consecutive years of center-left government (via the Concertación
coalition) have seen public (official) disclosures, truth and reconciliation commissions,
continued public debate, and continual international attention about Chile’s recent past.
Indeed, in these years significant work has been done to change the popular memory of
Pinochet’s rule and to reveal El Mercurio’s role in both the overthrow of the UP and the
stability of the military regime. These reasons, among others, have weakened El
Mercurio’s ability to “write” the nation in the same way it had prior to 1990.138

137

Recall Elizabeth Jelin’s argument about master narratives in her book State
Repression (See Chapter One).
138
Ken Leon-Dermota, Chileinédito: El periodismo bajo democracia (Santiago, Chile:
Ediciones B, 2002).
80

Despite its changing reputation, El Mercurio is nevertheless still Chile’s
newspaper of record. And, in spite of its support of a lengthy period of media censorship,
El Mercurio still maintains what it claims to be its historic posture as an advocate of free
speech and democracy. Of course, one can question how El Mercurio is able to defend
Pinochet’s dictatorship at the same time that it defends its own reputation as an
aggressive supporter of democratic ideals. As this is an essential question on an
ideological level – how dictatorships can write themselves as democracies – this chapter
will examine whether El Mercurio’s narrative of the past has changed as its own
(privileged) position in political society—and concomitantly that of the Right—has been
undermined or at least challenged by Pinochet’s exit from La Moneda, and then from
governing power. How do the traditional ‘winners’ re-evaluate and refashion their stories
of the past when faced with political defeat? To what extent do they turn to “history” in
order to gain or re-establish their (former) ideological hegemony, insuring that it is their
memory that will influence how future generations come to view the past and its meaning
in the present. For William Porath, a leading scholar of Chilean history and a professor at
the Catholic University’s School of Journalism, the matter has already been decided:
“The official history [of the past 35 years] will come slowly, but I believe it will be the
version of El Mercurio,” he told me.139 Whether Dr. Porath is correct remains to be seen,
but at the very least his words suggest the importance of paying close attention to the
ways in which El Mercurio constructs this history and subsequently how the newspaper
attempts to make its narrative “official.”
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Methodology:
As Jeffrey Olick has noted, “Changes in historical images…are not just one-time
interactions between the meanings of the distant past and the needs of the present. Rather,
from the moment being remembered, present images are constantly being reproduced,
revised, and replaced.140 Keeping Olick’s words in mind, this chapter focuses on five key
moments between 1990-2004 during which El Mercurio revises its narrative of the 17year period of dictatorship into a whiggish interpretation, emphasizing the on-going
(successful) struggle for democracy in Chilean history.
As specific “commemorative” moments often times provide the means to judge
change over time, I will use the anniversary of the Chilean coup of 1973 as one particular
moment to assess how the past itself has changed. in an interpretative sense. My other
time points include dates that mark the release of significant research and legal
investigations which revealed much about the nature of Pinochet’s regime.
My first temporal point is March 1990, a moment that marks Chile’s transition
back to civilian rule; the second comes in February 1991 with the release of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission’s final report, the “Informe Rettig.” The third moment occurs
in October 1998 with General Pinochet’s arrest in London. Next, I examine El
Mercurio’s reports of the events surrounding the 30th anniversary of the coup—
September 11, 2003. Finally, I consider the paper’s coverage of the release of the
“Valech” report from the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture in
November 2004.
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These dates represent key moments when Chile, as a nation, has had to consider
and engage with the specific history of the Pinochet dictatorship. And as such, they are
moments in which social actors representing different political projects have attempted to
inscribe a particular memory of the recent past on Chile’s political and cultural landscape.
While others have examined the role of the political Left in this process of constructing a
“counter-memory” to that of the Pinochet dictatorship, my work considers only the way
in which the political Right, through El Mercurio, has re-examined its relationship to the
past—at times to defend it, change it, acknowledge it, or ignore it – in light of cascading
historical disclosures and documentation.
My research methods were guided predominantly by a close reading of the
newspapers. For each time-moment mentioned above, I examined El Mercurio for a
month surrounding the event. For September 11, 2003, for instance, I began my analysis
on September 1, 2003 and ended on September 30th. For some events, such as the release
of Informe Valech, when news coverage spanned more than a single month, my analysis
shifted accordingly—continuing through the first week of December 2004.
The specific sections I focused on were news articles and news analysis taken
from the front page, the national news section, and the editorial section—which included
both El Mercurio’s formal editorial columns as well as invited opinion columns (i.e., “op
eds”). I also, at times, studied the weekend Report (“Reportajes”), the Economics and
Business section, and occasionally the weekend magazine supplements. My research
targeted articles that specifically addressed or somehow evoked the past. The majority of
the articles that analyze Chile’s history came from the opinion section while coverage of
contemporary events surfaced in news articles and the news analysis sections.
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Some central questions guided my reading of El Mercurio during these moments.
The first is the fundamental historical inquiry: does El Mercurio’s narrative of the past
change from date to date and if so, what new elements/ingredients does it employ to
construct an understanding of the past that might reflect positively on Pinochet’s regime?
Does El Mercurio’s account incorporate dissident or “counter-memory” narratives? If so,
how does it approach those themes? Finally, if El Mercurio’s narrative evolves to reflect
new perspectives and incorporate new realities of the past, then is it also the case that
right-wing politics in Chile has come to understand itself differently and has absorbed the
critique of its own past? Or has Pinochet’s regime been normalized in such a fashion as to
allow the Right to maintain a fundamentally authoritarian ideology under the guise of a
democratic framework?
In my analysis I emphasize six specific themes in El Mercurio’s coverage:
political institutionalism; economic and social modernizations; the concept of chilenidad
(Chilean identity); human rights abuses; the symbolic interactions between Allende and
Pinochet; and the question of History itself, including attempts to close off the past. As
one or more of these themes emerge throughout the different dates, the reader discerns
how El Mercurio constructs its narrative of democratic progress.
I. The Return to Civilian Rule (March 1990)
March 11, 1990 was a watershed in Chilean history for two interrelated reasons.
First, it was the day that General Augusto Pinochet officially stepped down as ruler of
Chile and the military returned the institutional political system to civilian hands.
Pinochet, of course, would remain as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces until
1998, at which point, and under the terms established by his own Constitution of 1980, he
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became a Senator for Life. Second, this month also marked the return of a center-left
government to Chile as Patricio Aylwin and his Concertación coalition, which included
Allende’s Socialist Party, assumed power.141
How does El Mercurio—the paper that had for the previous seventeen years
offered its unfaltering support to Pinochet’s dictatorship—interpret the transfer of power
from Augusto Pinochet to Patricio Aylwin? In its coverage of the transition to civilian
rule, El Mercurio will assert a Chilean “renaissance” narrative, stressing that between
1973 and 1990 Chile experienced nothing less than a national re-birth. According to the
paper, Pinochet and the Junta were not only the “saviors” of the nation, having rescued
Chile from at the hands of the Popular Unity government, but more importantly, they
were the “fathers” or the “founders” of a new democratic Chile. El Mercurio’s discourse
invokes key themes of political institutionalism, economic and social modernization and
nationalism to establish what could be called a renovationist narrative of Pinochet’s rule.
Renovation and Restoration of Democracy in Chile:
On observing Pinochet’s exit from La Moneda in March 1990, El Mercurio
credits the dictator with leading two projects that, at first glance, appear to be
contradictory. Pinochet is honored for conducting both a process of democratic
restoration and one of democratic renovation.142 The restoration refers to the return of
democratic electoral processes when, on December 14, 1989, the Chilean people again
went to the polls and elected as their president the leader of the Concertación, Patricio
Aylwin. Even though Pinochet had suspended the Chilean electoral process in 1973; even
though there are numerous credible accounts from Pinochet’s closest collaborators in the
141
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military that he veered toward falsifying the results of the 1988 plebiscite and imposing
emergency rule as it became clear that the voters were rejecting him; and even though the
majority of historical accounts will credit the broad popular opposition movement
beginning in 1982 with finally forcing Pinochet’s hand, El Mercurio still depicts the 1989
elections as a gift from Pinochet.143
The theme of “restoration” gradually merges into that of “renovation” as El
Mercurio stresses the continuity between the out-going and the in-coming governments.
In the days leading up to Aylwin’s inauguration on March 11, El Mercurio readers are
inundated with photos, particularly on the front page or the first page of the national news
section, of Aylwin and Pinochet together. In the photos, the two men, often referred to as
“los dos mandatarios” (“the two heads of state”), are seen conversing inside the nation’s
“democratic” statehouses (See Appendix, Article 1).144 These photos convey political
continuity—the stable and peaceful transition of power from one democratic leader to the
next. There is nothing to suggest that Pinochet and Aylwin did not assume the role of
head of state in the same way. To not represent the crucial difference that Aylwin was
elected President whereas Pinochet seized power in a bloody coup and lost the only
popular election he was part of, is key to understanding the manner in which El Mercurio
shapes a history to accommodate its larger political narrative. Although a restoration of
democratic electoral processes had, indeed, occurred, it becomes blurred to the extent that
it is narrated as a transition—a passing of the presidential sash between two legitimate
heads of state.
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As El Mercurio represents it, the restoration of democracy in Chile was not only
one mission of Pinochet’s government but its central task, and the transition to civilian
rule certified that it was a “misión cumplida” (mission accomplished.) 145 In that sense
“restoration” (understood as the return to democratic governance after a period of
absence) was conflated with an opposite term, “renovation,” which implies that under
Pinochet, democracy was never really abandoned. In an op-ed piece entitled “Presidente
Pinochet,” Juan Eduardo King writes, “I feel a need to say that President Pinochet carried
off this period of transition initiated on October 5, 1988 in an impeccable fashion.”146
Many op-ed pieces in El Mercurio comment on the nature of the transition back to
democracy, emphasizing the military’s central role in its peaceful orchestration: “Chile’s
military was not expelled from power. They began to return [devolver] power [to the
civilians] voluntarily and systematically.”147 With the verb “devolver”—to return—the
author displaces agency from the electoral process, a process increasingly impelled by
anti-Pinochet protesters, and instead privileges the military’s role.
To emphasize this interpretation, writers in El Mercurio argue that a restoration of
the democratic electoral process was always Pinochet’s plan, although his own speeches
make little reference to this for many years: “On being defeated in the plebiscite of
October 1988, Pinochet never doubted in the least that he would hand over [entregar]
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power, according to the calendar established [by the Constitution of 1980] on March 11,
1990, and this is exactly what he did.”148 The reader again observes the intentional use of
the word “entregar”—to hand in/deliver—which stresses Pinochet’s intention to return
Chile to civilian rule. Again, one should keep in mind that the historical record suggests a
very different process in which Pinochet “flirted with the idea of ignoring the electoral
results… [H]e denounced his advisors, demanded emergency powers, and then
impetuously threatened to resign when other members of the junta counseled against the
maneuver.”149 The restoration of democracy is presented not as a process whereby a
dictator is removed from power following a popular rejection and a stern warning from
his fellow generals, but rather as the gift from a leader who voluntarily and
democratically gave it back. Further, throughout the first eight years of Concertación
governance (1990-1998), Pinochet would constantly threaten to return to power if the
Concertación, in his words, “touches even one hair on the heads of my men.”
For El Mercurio, the theme of democratic restoration allowed it to narrate a Chile
that never really detoured from democracy during the Pinochet years. In an editorial from
March 11, entitled “La Restauración de la democracia” (“The Restoration of
Democracy”), the newspaper figuratively merges Aylwin and Pinochet, giving them
equal standing and, again, crediting the military for having upheld this passage to
democracy:
The presence of both leaders represents a foundation of republican
continuity, which is essential in order to assure the political stability of the
country…[and that] the transition to democracy is able to reach its
culmination. …The whole country, and especially the Armed Forces and
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forces of Order, are those who have led this process, and they should be
very proud of what they have done.150
As the Armed Forces are given the responsibility for the return of civilian elections,
Aylwin becomes a figure not of change but of continuity. Whereas this move indicates a
political displacement, in which the figure of change (Aylwin) becomes somehow
complicit with Pinochet, another move in the same editorial marks an important historical
displacement: “The transition thus has reached its culmination. Now no one can doubt
that Chile has returned to full democracy.”151 The syntax of this sentence is key. Where
El Mercurio could have suggested that the country’s transition process would begin with
Aylwin’s presidency (thereby implying that the success of the transition would depend,
as the success of all such transitions) on the willingness of the military to return to the
barracks and not threaten a return to power, instead it sees this moment as the
culmination of the transitional process. To suggest that the transition has ended now that
Pinochet is no longer President essentially makes Aylwin accountable for any ensuing
“failures” of democracy and relieves Pinochet from that burden, regardless of his
behavior. This point is further driven home when El Mercurio reports Aylwin’s vow to
maintain the “historic institutionality” of the Fuerzas Armadas. For El Mercurio, while
full democracy has been restored in Chile, its permanence rests on the Concertación’s
pledge to preclude civilian attempts to meddle with the Armed Forces. Thus, challenges
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to Chile’s restored democracy will not be due to any threats that the military will place on
the civilian government (which will happen frequently).152
In that sense, then, El Mercurio credits Pinochet for restoring democracy, while
also pointing, in broader terms, to Pinochet’s renovation of Chile’s political system and
the (new) democratic social order it engendered. As one op-ed suggests, “[Pinochet] tried
to put his vision for what would be best for the country in an institutional framework.”153
In a salient news article entitled, “Impulsan Amplia Reestructuración,” (“Projecting a
Broad Reconstruction”), El Mercurio quotes from the president of the Supreme Court as
he concludes,
In our country…we have been actors as well as witnesses to the
triumph of democracy. The Chilean people have influenced the
open enthusiasm of the Supreme Government to begin with
renewed energy on the road to liberty, to a [renewed] faith in man,
and to the full observance of law, the only guarantee of human
dignity.154
The Supreme Court President—and here it must be stressed that the Supreme Court
remained loyal to the military government until long after 1998—once again highlights
the end of the transition and, thus, the triumph of democracy. Pinochet’s rule has past
and, as the Supreme Court President continues, it is that rule that has enabled Chile to
emerge to a new stage of liberty and freedom:
As citizens, we are grateful for this new stage and we ask God to
enlighten the new government with the ability to lead the country
in democracy, using the path of reconciliation, peace and truth, so
that the dignity of the rights of man will always be the basic
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principle which guides and animates the actions of each one of
those who carry on their shoulders the heavy responsibility which
comes with leading the nation to the achievement of its common
interests.155
In this excerpt from 1990, the chief magistrate of the judicial body that will, for the next
decade, consistently rebuff any legal challenges by human rights groups to Pinochet and
the military, implicitly links Pinochet, who has led “us” to this day, to the observance of
human rights and the continued search for the “bien común.”
In a notable editorial, “Restauración de la Democracia,” (“Democracy Restored”,
which would be more accurately translated as “Democracy Re-Invented”), El Mercurio
summons all Chileans to feel pride in Chile’s new democracy and all that the military
regime has bequeathed them.
The military put on their shoulders an historic responsibility. From
the very first moment, they declared their intention to restore the
lost democracy, and they committed themselves to that task with
seriousness and with the energy to accomplish all the necessary
transformations needed to reach institutional, social, and economic
renovation.156
While El Mercurio constantly encouraged its readers in this crucial month that “we will
never forget…that we were capable of lifting Chile from ruin, and that we have built a
new, modern, and booming country,” it will also suggest that it was Pinochet who
established a whole new kind of democracy.157 An editorial from March 25 entitled, “La
Revolución que Nadie Conoce” (“The Revolution that No One Knows”) further
illustrates this point:
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How does one translate the Chilean case to the Third World as a
whole? The people who reached power in 1973 realized that not
only was a democratic civilization not flourishing [in Chile] – an
image which the world’s intelligentsia adopted – but rather all that
remained in this polarized country was the formal skeleton of
democracy… [T]hey realized that they had to do something more
to prevent the reestablishment of the system which existed before,
to prevent the return of the leaders of yesteryear. They had to build
a new institutional superstructure, and the model which they chose
was the same one which had allowed Chile to become a clear
example for the great part of the world during almost all the
Nineteenth Century.158
Through this editorial, El Mercurio makes several crucial points. In the first place, it
insists on the fact that it wasn’t Pinochet who challenged democracy in Chile, it was
Allende’s government, and, by implication, the weak (reformist) governments that
preceded it. In the place of democracy’s feeble (pre-coup) skeleton in Chile, the Junta
constructed a robust new democracy. In the second place, El Mercurio suggests that the
military could accomplish this only by creating a “new” institutional order, an order
which pointed back to the nineteenth century, and a golden age when Chile was the envy
of the world. This excerpt reveals El Mercurio as it removes Allende from Chile’s
democratic narrative and inserts Pinochet into his place.
The Constitution of 1980 often stands at the center of El Mercurio’s whiggish
narrative, the concrete proof that Pinochet’s rule was not a deviation from democracy but
rather a well-conceived plan to renovate it. In a March 8th news article, El Mercurio
quotes Pinochet as he notes that “The political constitution approved in 1980 and ratified
in 1989…came to definitively consecrate the democratic values which our government

158

El Mercurio, March 25, 1990, James Whelan “La Revolución que Nadie Conoce,” A2.
92

supported.”159 Of greatest importance here is the sacrilization of the Constitution of 1980,
the assertion that not only was democracy highly valued by the dictatorship, but it was
only through Pinochet’s efforts—most notably, his Constitution – that Chile has
democracy. (As I noted in the previous chapter, the Constitution of 1980 seriously
revised some basic tenets of liberal democracy, refusing political participation to those
who held certain beliefs and filling the upper chamber of the legislature with unelected
senators).
Further, El Mercurio suggests that through his Constitution, Pinochet achieved
political consensus (a consensus that did not exist in reality) and has thus garnered the
support of President Aylwin and his Concertación alliance, “The new authorities have
understood that these advances only were possible thanks to a very profound change in
the focus of government, such as placing liberty and personal initiative ahead of the old
state.”160 By showcasing a consensus that does not exist, particularly one that cast the
dictatorship as the sponsor of “liberty” and the government previous to Pinochet as
representing the “old state,” El Mercurio rhetorically connects the new government with
Pinochet’s project.
By arguing that the Pinochet regime renovated democracy in Chile, El Mercurio
reverses history discursively: Allende becomes the dictator and Pinochet the democrat. In
the same sense, the paper will suggest, within this renovation frame, that Pinochet and his
government did not just “right the wrongs” of the Popular Unity, but went further to carry
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out a democratic revolution: “[Chile] is, in a word, a country which has experienced a
revolution: a revolution which, truly, was successful.”161 In the opinion piece entitled
“Memorias del Gobierno” (“Memories of the Government”), which argues that only
Pinochet has achieved what had been attempted unsuccessfully in the past, the
anonymous author places Pinochet in comparison with both Allende and the Christian
Democrat Eduardo Frei, noting that while these two “socialists” failed to bring about “a
complete renovation of national life,” Pinochet succeeded beyond all expectations:
…it is interesting to note that the programs of the last three presidents –
Frei, Allende, and Pinochet – all had the same goal, although they
employed different terminologies. But if one measures [their success]
from the standpoint of achieving their aims, of the three, the military
regime was the only one which could be considered to have achieved them
in a very high degree.162
The comparison is notable because it suggests that the military regime acted not against
the “socialist” Allende, but rather against Chile’s tradition of reform governments. To be
sure, the article does not consider either the violent methods Pinochet used to achieve his
ends or the fact that the general was in power for 17 years while Allende was violently
overthrown after only three. Yet more important for my discussion is that El Mercurio’s
narrative works to invert the facts of Chile’s history, placing the Pinochet regime within a
positivist narrative that sees Chile’s history as a journey to democratic fulfillment. Thus,
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Allende becomes the dictator and Pinochet the democrat; Pinochet the revolutionary and
Allende the conservative state bureaucrat.
At this first temporal point, March 1990, then, we can see how El Mercurio
begins to construct a narrative with two central threads, both of which identify Pinochet
with a democratic project. One, the restorationist, will credit Pinochet with returning
Chile to a full-fledged democratic government, modeled on those who brought Chile to
glory in the nineteenth century. The second, renovationist, argued that Pinochet’s
intention to leave Chile with a stronger democracy had become nothing short of a
democratic revolution. With these narratives in place, the paper also firmly establishes
the success of Pinochet’s project and declares that it has garnered broad consensual
support and, therefore, is unassailable. All parties have agreed to Pinochet’s terms;
history is over and cannot be reopened. Indeed, to do so, to “go back in time,” as it were,
would undermine the nation’s reconciliation process. As such, El Mercurio’s approach
carries an implicit threat to the Concertación that it should not attempt to “alter” or even
examine the past. El Mercurio will employ these unifying themes repeatedly throughout
the post-dictatorship period.
******
II. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report (February 1991)
Two months after assuming office as the first democratically elected President of
Chile since Allende, Patricio Aylwin, convened a National Truth and Reconciliation
Commission to investigate the gross human rights violations that had been committed
during Pinochet’s regime. This eight-member body, lead by Raúl Rettig, a well-respected
lawyer, ambassador and former minister from the Radical Party, was allotted nine months
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to report on human rights violations during the military’s rule. Although the Commission
was restricted to investigating only murders and disappearances (i.e., presumed killings),
the Commission’s main goals were, nevertheless, to reveal the causes and circumstances
of political deaths during the previous regime and to determine, to the extent possible, the
victims’ fates. The Commission began work in March 1990 with an extensive
interviewing process that culminated on February 11, 1991 with the submission of its
final report to President Aylwin. President Aylwin disclosed the major findings of the
report to the public in a televised national address by in March 1991. In this speech,
arguably the most significant of his presidency, Aylwin called upon the entire Chilean
nation to recognize “the moral unacceptability of human rights abuses perpetrated by
state agents,”163 and the need for a better future contingent on the “moral reconstruction
of society and the consolidation of democratic institutions.”164
The release of the Rettig Report, as it became known, was thus the first time the
military government— and its credibility and “salvation” legacy—was directly
challenged by the new government. It marked the first time the regime’s own “official”
history confronted a counter-narrative delivered not by opposition politicians, but rather
by an authorized governmental entity. The very fact that El Mercurio reported the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission and the release of its report is telling in and of itself. One
must acknowledge that for El Mercurio – the singular media voice of Pinochet’s
regime—allocating print space to an issue that subtracted from the military regime’s
credibility was noteworthy. As Ignacio Aguero argues, El Mercurio still had not
acknowledged the extent to which it misinformed its readers about the disappearances
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that occurred during the dictatorship.165 El Mercurio’s coverage of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission’s 1991 findings, then, is a central moment to see how it will
incorporate what might be called an “inconvenient truth” into its historical account of the
military regime, a history that it has already claimed was based on a mission to provide
Chile with a functional and modernized democracy.166
Throughout February 1991, one observes the way in which El Mercurio uses the
Rettig Report and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission itself as evidence not of
Pinochet’s abusive rule but rather as a way to mark Chile’s road to progress. Although it
could no longer deny that human rights abuses occurred, El Mercurio maintained a
defensive posture towards the Rettig Report. Even as its news articles and editorials
stressed that the report should in no way challenge the military’s amnesty laws, most
notably the broad Amnesty decree which Pinochet authored in 1978, El Mercurio
simultaneously established a “bad apples” narrative to absolve Pinochet and the military
of criminal responsibility.167
Amnesty Law of 1978 and the Closure of History:
For El Mercurio, the very task assumed by the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission – the interrogation of the past – is problematic. As such, the paper will
attempt to discursively close it (history) off by suggesting that historical inquiry itself
challenges the authority of the Constitution of 1980 and therefore threatens Chilean
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stability and the nation’s democratic renovation. Consequently, right-wing opposition to
a proposal to strike down the military’s amnesty, becomes a rallying point for El
Mercurio to defend Pinochet’s regime and, concurrently, its positivist narrative of his
rule.168
In a news article, El Mercurio quotes Andres Allamand, the leader of the
conservative Renovación Nacional Party (RN) as he notes, “therefore, the 1978 Amnesty
[decree] should be kept – it is legally indispensable, politically necessary, and is a
positive element in the desire for reconciliation.”169 El Mercurio will acknowledge the
past; its choice is not to negate the revelations now emerging from the government. But at
the same time the paper will implicitly suggest that “too much history” could yield
negative consequences for Chile’s new democracy. Thus, if El Mercurio’s first move in
March 1990 is to recast the history of the Pinochet regime, with the Rettig Report it will
imply that there are dangers to the present (and future) in looking too deeply into the past.
To the extent that Chile’s dark past of torture and disappearances has been
examined by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, El Mercurio will claim that
Rettig’s is a one-sided view of history that errs by failing to explain the historical context
in which human rights were violated. El Mercurio gives ample coverage to RN leader
Andrés Allamand who argues just this point: “If one wants to reach the complete and
historic truth about what has happened in Chile, it is fundamental to take note of the
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background, the causes which set the stage for the violation of human rights in Chile.”170
According to Allamand, human rights violations ensued as a result of the chaotic social
and political context generated by Allende’s government. From Allamand’s outlook,
Pinochet’s amnesty was a correct act and must not be challenged.
Several other editorials that address the Rettig Report broadly assume this same
defensive posture, and are wary about probing the Pinochet period too deeply. As an
editorial from February 3 entitled, “La Concertación en 1991,” suggests that
Historical forgetfulness has led the leaders of the governing
alliance, who previously challenged the country’s [growing]
success and, even earlier, failed to acknowledge the danger which
totalitarian Marxism and its armed cadre presented, to now become
the accusers and judges of the forces which, heeding the call of a
democratic citizenry, had to suffocate the extremist revolutionary
plot.171
For El Mercurio’s editors, the Rettig Report signifies an unwarranted incursion into the
field of history. Their editorials scantily address the subject of the report itself—the
disturbing and dark past it unearths – but rather focus on the “forgetfulness” of the Left
(i.e., the Concertación government). According to El Mercurio what has been “forgotten”
is defiantly not the human rights abuses of the Pinochet government, but rather the
actions of “totalitarian Marxism and its armed cadre.” In another reversal, Allende’s
supporters, having conveniently “forgotten” their past, become responsible for the abuses
that followed—while El Mercurio refrains from passing judgment on the actions of the
military government.

170
171

Ibid.
El Mercurio, February 3, 1991, “La Concertación en 1991,” editorial.
99

In several editorials, however, El Mercurio does remind its readers who is the real
threat to Chilean democracy. In “Amenaza Comunista” (“Communist Menace”), for
example, the editors argue that the real threat from Communism is not its terrorism, but
its willingness to break from Chile’s democratic tradition at any moment: “The behavior
of Chilean communism betrays a surprising stubbornness which suggests that their
devotion to democracy, today as yesterday, is a promise that can be unilaterally severed
at any moment.”172 Because of this, according to El Mercurio, Chile must not allow the
Communists to define “what democracy is [or] what human rights are and how they
should be protected and defended.”173 Again, El Mercurio has reversed the field of
history. In Chile it was the Left which was elected democratically in 1970 and the
opposition Center-Right which “unilaterally severed” its “devotion to democracy” three
years later. Indeed, it was the Chilean military that, according to the Rettig Report,
violated human rights on a massive scale. While El Mercurio’s coverage of the Rettig
report accepts the confirmation of large-scale human rights violations under the military
government (as opposed to denying that anything untoward occurred, as Pinochet himself
would continue to maintain almost until his death), it discursively blames the violations
on the Left and disputes their right to raise any critiques at all.
Nunca Más:
After the release of the Rettig Report, El Mercurio incorporates the slogan “Never
Again” (Nunca Más) into its narrative. The phrase, of course, was borrowed from postHolocaust discourse to emerge as the slogan of human rights movements throughout
Latin America. “Nunca más” has since the 1970s become a way to call upon the national
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and international community to bear witness to the abuses that occurred in the past and to
work to ensure that these violations never happen again. Despite its origins, however, the
phrase over time has been adopted by sectors of the Right, and even by Pinochet who
appropriated it, suggesting the instability of even the most historically grounded signs.
For Pinochet, “never again” would Chile return to the conditions of 1970, with an elected
Socialist president and a left-wing government.
El Mercurio also integrates “nunca más” and the perspective that “human rights
violations should never happen again,” into its discourse. But as several news articles
suggest, El Mercurio uses the phrase both to absolve Pinochet from any legal
responsibilities for his actions and to seal off the past from further exposure. Further, for
El Mercurio, human rights violations happened but they were committed by some “bad
apples” who, responding to the needs at the time, did what they thought was best for the
stability and progress of the Chilean nation.
In addition, El Mercurio’s adoption of a social justice slogan underscores its
perspective that changing the Amnesty Law—which it sees as altering the past—would
legitimize a subjective reading of history and, consequently, threaten Chile’s newly
restored democracy. El Mercurio frames this discussion of human rights as a warning: If
Chile continues to examine the past—if it goes beyond simply acknowledging the past
(as the paper, itself, has done in its news articles and editorials), democracy will itself be
endangered. In other words, returning to the theme of history and memory, El Mercurio
will accept that these new disclosures (“subjective” and “uncontextualized” as they are
characterized by the paper) can have a meaning “for” the present – as History – but they
cannot have a meaning “in” the present – as Memory; they cannot be a cause for action,
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only study. But as with its reporting a year earlier, El Mercurio’s reports on the Rettig
Report leave it up to the reader to determine what would happen and who would
jeopardize Chilean democracy if the past were to be fully examined and made meaningful
in the present.
******
III. Pinochet’s Arrest in London (October 1998)
Pinochet turned over executive power to a civilian government in 1990, but that
did not mean he relinquished all his institutional controls. To the contrary, he continued
to serve as Commander in Chief of the Army until 1998, a post from which he frequently
harassed both President Aylwin and his successor, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (son of the
Christian Democratic president from 1964-1970, Eduardo Frei Montalva). That title he
would only give up in 1998.174 Shortly after finishing his term as Army head, Pinochet
traveled to London on an arms purchasing trip, to visit his close confidant, Margaret
Thatcher, and for a routine surgical procedure on his back. While in London, Pinochet
was detained by Scotland Yard personnel acting on an international arrest warrant filed
by Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón on a variety of charges. Specifically, the warrant
which called for Pinochet’s extradition to Spain charged him with 94 counts of torture
and the assassination of Spaniards in Chile during his dictatorship. Pinochet’s case
unfolded over sixteen months of intense dispute in a variety of London courts, ultimately
landing with the Law Lords, Britain’s closest equivalent to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The issue before the Law Lords was whether Pinochet could be extradited to
Spain to face trial. The courts questioned the lawfulness of “sovereign immunity”—a
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concept whereby heads of state were exempt from prosecution for crimes committed
during their time in power by virtue of the fact that they were acting on behalf of the
state. The Chilean government, under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, defended
Pinochet’s immunity because of his status as former president and the current immunity
he enjoyed as Senator-for-Life. The prosecutors (along with human rights organizations
and the United Nations) argued that Pinochet should be extradited under the notion that
crimes against humanity are subject to universal jurisdiction and can be tried anywhere if
there is strong evidence that they won’t be brought to justice in their own courts.
The House of Lords ultimately rejected Pinochet’s defense and, in the process,
created a new standard in international law by denying claims of sovereign immunity for
such charges as crimes against humanity and genocide. Ultimately, the Law Lords would
only charge Pinochet for crimes occurring after 1988 (the date when the UK adopted
legislation from the United Nations Convention against torture).175 Irrespective, Pinochet
was released to Chile on March 3, 2000 after Home Secretary Jack Straw determined that
he was unfit to stand trial in Spain. Yet the Chile that Pinochet returned to was a different
one than he left, largely due to the intense publicity and controversy his arrest had
occasioned. For the first time, prosecutors and judges (in Chile they are the same person),
led by Judge Juan Guzmán, began the laborious process of bringing legal actions against
Pinochet. In August of 2000 the Chilean Supreme Court stripped Pinochet of his
immunity as Senator-for-Life, but although a variety of suits were brought against him,
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his legal team, largely claiming his physical unfitness to stand trial, succeeded in keeping
him out of the courthouse until his ultimate death in December 2006.176
Pinochet’s arrest in London made international headlines, but caused an huge
uproar in Chile. Despite eight years of democratic government and continuous talk of
“reconciliation,” those pursuing legal justice against Pinochet had achieved meager aid
and few results. Pinochet’s position as Senator for Life, the Amnesty law of 1978, and
other protections written into the 1980 Constitution made it almost impossible to charge
him with crimes committed during his time in power. In fact, by 1998, as Brian Loveman
notes, President Frei decided to “negotiate with the political elite a ley de punto final
[full-stop law]...to ‘finish’ with the human rights issue” once and for all.177 But
Pinochet’s arrest would only serve to unveil the historical and memory disputes which
continued to divide how the Chilean people understood their past and its meaning in the
present. Pinochet’s arrest also provoked new conversations about how Chile, in a new era
of democratic government, would situate itself vis-à-vis a Pinochet who, in his time in
London, had become a metonym for dictator. 178
Reactions to the General’s detention in London were varied. For many,
particularly in the center-Left, Pinochet’s arrest was met with the triumphant cheers of
those who had fought for social justice. It meant that Chile and the world would bear
witness to the truth that Pinochet and his regime were responsible not just for “excesses,”
but for crimes against humanity. For another sector of Chile’s populace, however,
Pinochet’s arrest was seen as both without merit and nothing short of a direct
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infringement on Chile’s national sovereignty. This group—the so-called pinochetistas—
found Pinochet then (and now) either innocent of all charges or to be praised for acting in
the best interests of the Chilean state. Harkening back to a Chile of “three thirds,” another
substantial portion of Chile’s population came down in the middle of the debate. This
section of society—which included some conservative leaders—recognized the need for
legal action and agreed that Pinochet needed to stand trial for the charges against him, but
was also critical of what it saw as an international prepotencia (arrogance) and backed
the argument that for Pinochet to be arrested in London or tried in Spain undermined
Chilean sovereignty.179
Throughout its coverage of Pinochet’s arrest, El Mercurio invokes Chilean
identity—using Pinochet to represent Chilean nationhood and sovereignty—to normalize
Pinochet’s actions and bring him under its whiggish interpretation of Chilean progress.
Specifically, El Mercurio employed a narrative of collective (national) guilt, which acted
to absolve Pinochet of any individual responsibility. In order to place historical blame on
the Chilean nation, the most salient change in El Mercurio’s narrative throughout this
month is the separation of Pinochet, the man, from the political and social project for
which, previously, he had been directly credited. El Mercurio summons the whole
populace to take responsibility for its past and to defend Pinochet for the sake of their
present and future.
El Mercurio attempts to convert Pinochet into the symbol of Chilean identity,
offsetting a dominant international discourse which increasingly sees him as the
personification of dictatorship. Demanding Pinochet’s release, then, opens a way for
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Chile to defend the democracy and the progress the nation has achieved since the
transition back to democracy while simultaneously eliding the need to bring Pinochet to
trial. Adopting a similar perspective as it did during the release of the Rettig Report, El
Mercurio calls for a punto final [final stop] to any misgivings about the past and demands
a focus, instead, on the future. The paper includes a number of op-eds, editorials and
news articles from authors with different political leanings to reinforce the point that to
investigate or alter Chile’s’ history would threaten the nation itself. In a news article from
October 18, for example, El Mercurio quotes RN representative Alberto Cadenmil:
The arrest of Senator Pinochet represents the gravest problem the
country has confronted in terms of reconciliation. This is not a
question between pinochetistas and antipinochetistas but rather a
question of State that affects the politics, liberty, and security of all
Chileans…The Chilean society had closed the transition [process]
and now the international community wants to open it—which
represents an enormous threat to the country and all its citizens.180
A key issue to arise in Chilean society after Pinochet had left the Moneda was exactly
what posed the greatest threat to the stability of Chile’s democracy. For El Mercurio and
most conservative thinkers, the greatest threat came in re-opening the “transitional
process” for examination. As we have seen, conservative writers tend to see the entire
Pinochet regime as one of “transition” since his intention was “always” to return the
country to a “renovated” democracy. For much of Chile’s Left, the greatest threat was
just the opposite—not examining the past. Here one observes Cadenmil not only assert
that the transition is a matter of concern only for Chileans, but in the context of
Pinochet’s “mission accomplished” statement, examination of this process is closed. This
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reinforces El Mercurio’s argument that the past is something that must be sealed off, put
away, punto final.181
Countless other news articles and op-ed pieces intimate that Pinochet’s arrest
opens up historical fissures that Chile, as a nation, had successfully stitched together
during the last eight years. Pinochet’s arrest puts “our dignity and national honor up for
grabs,” whereas, in the view of El Mercurio, what the international community hasn’t
understood is the progress that Chile has experienced because of Pinochet’s leadership:182
The political transition that Chile has achieved during these last ten years
has been considered successful by the national and international
community. After having gone through traumatic moments of national
division, of economic crisis and serious social problems, [the country] has
been able to relocate itself on a path of political and economic accord to
which the great majority of the nation’s political actors have given their
consent…. [O]ur country has been able to reach this social consensus
which has allowed us to move from the military government toward a
democratic regime [marked by] economic development and social
progress.183
Much as with other articles, the author of this op-ed emphasizes that the past is over and
that there is no use in revising or unearthing these “traumatic moments of national
division.” But the basis for claiming that the past has passed and shouldn’t be reopened is
the assumed success of the transition, which itself is demonstrated by a supposed
“agreement” reached by the nation’s political actors. What this, and El Mercurio’s view
in general, tends to ignore is the large part of the Chilean population left out of this
consensus, for whom the past remained a painful wound.
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While it seeks to close the past, El Mercurio consolidates its vision of Pinochet’s
legacy and Allende’s failure. In a sharply partisan editorial written by Pablo Rodríguez
Grez, the former leader of the neo-fascist “Patria y Libertad” terrorist group which
harassed the Allende government, and the man who later became Pinochet’s lawyer,
argues:
What is the road to national reconciliation? In my opinion it begins
with an honest interpretation and analysis of what happened in
Chile from 1970 forward, admitting that there is blame to be
shared… [T]he military regime began a long process of
reconstruction and, what is more important, of a restructuring of
our fundamental institutions. This last task was absolutely
necessary in order to reestablish [refundar] a democracy that will
not be at the mercy of revolutionary adventurers. The military
regime committed errors. This is true, particularly in terms of
excesses committed in the area of human rights. All revolutions –
and this was a revolution – have a price…[T]he military
government did its best, and successfully, to restore a liberal
democracy capable of defending itself, so that it can avoid future
rabid tyrants. It is this reality, which we so clearly face.184
If his arrest translates to a threat to the nation, then El Mercurio must remind its
readers of what Pinochet did for Chile. In this rhetorical tour de force, Rodríquez Grez
makes several points that, more than anything, aid El Mercurio’s inversion of history. As
with earlier El Mercurio articles, here the question of who is a “real” revolutionary arises
again. The paper dismisses the Chilean left as “adventures” and declares that the “real
revolution” came from Pinochet. Secondly, while accepting that errors were made by
Pinochet, Rodríquez Grez excuses the military’s human rights violations by claiming that
all revolutions have their costs and, as the Chilean case proves, the ends justify the
means. Last but not least, the author asserts that Chile now has a new institutional system
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that will prevent another “embestida liberticida.” One must pause here to consider the
author’s use of this phrase, for it contains the central reversal within a rhetorical scheme
that El Mercurio has employed since 1990. “Liberticida” is the term for tyrant. Rodríguez
Grez turns Allende into the “tyrant” (and a bestial one, at that) and Pinochet into Chile’s
democratic savior. While historians still debate how best to represent these two men, it
remains beyond argument that it was only Pinochet who acted as dictator in Chile (i.e.,
without an electoral mandate or legislative constraints), and only Pinochet who was
condemned by national and international human rights agencies for actions perpetrated
during seventeen years in power. Yet El Mercurio depicts Pinochet’s dictatorship as a
democratic revolution whose errors, while admitted, must be forgiven.
The rhetoric of historical inversion emerges in yet another news article from
October 27:
They have tried to hide from international public opinion the historic truth
that under the Chilean military government, the country which had been
destroyed by a Marxist dictatorship was reconstructed, and that with the
support and initiative of this military government, a solid, prosperous, and
stable democracy was installed, along with a free economy that is
achieving progress and winning the fight against poverty.185
Through this article and others to surface in El Mercurio during this month, the
newspaper changes its narrative in several ways. Although most of El Mercurio’s articles
recognize that Pinochet’s leadership sparked divisions in society, they nonetheless argue
that these divisions have lessened over the last eight years of reconciliation and
democracy.
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Consistent with other moments (March 1990 and February 1991), El Mercurio’s
editorial approach contains a set of veiled threats as it reports on Pinochet’s arrest. As the
historic roles of Allende and Pinochet get reversed, the claim that Chile’s new democracy
will “never again” witness the rise of another tyrant is seen to refer back to Allende, and
not Pinochet. “Nunca más” thus rhetorically confirms Pinochet’s understanding of
history: never again will Chile allow “Allende” to come to power, not never again will
the country acquiesce to the disappearances and torture of large numbers of its citizens.
But given that Allende rose to power by elections, El Mercurio’s discourse questions
whether Chile’s conservative parties will accept an electoral decision that counters their
perceived interests. Further, the question El Mercurio raises is the extent to which the
examination of Chile’s past itself might constitute a return to a forbidden past.
******
IV. The Thirtieth Anniversary of the Coup (September 11, 2003)
While the 25th Anniversary of the coup of 1973 (1998) may seem like the most
logical commemorative marker for looking back at the coup and what followed, , the 30th
anniversary (2003) became more salient for several reasons. In the first place, the 25th
anniversary occurred shortly before Pinochet arrest in London. His arrest and the legal
proceedings it unleashed produced the first serious public investigation into Pinochet’s
own actions and responsibilities. Additionally, in March 2000, Ricardo Lagos, the first
Socialist president since Allende, assumed leadership of the country. Unlike his
predecessor, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, who had tried to close off the “Pinochet” and
human rights stories, Lagos more strongly encouraged Chile’s examination of its past.
Lagos initiated a “Mesa de Diálogo” [“Dialogue Forum”] in 2000 to confront “the legacy
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of the military regime’s human rights abuses,” which as he saw it, was essential to
achieving the “shared dream of national unity and political reconciliation.”186
For these and other reasons, the 30th anniversary provides an important
commemorative moment through which to explore transformations in El Mercurio’s
historical narrative, as it re-opened with newfound fervor the opportunity for Chile to
confront its recent past. Examination of the 30th anniversary, a historical memory
bonanza, can demonstrate to what degree El Mercurio’s dominant narrative had
accommodated to the rapidly accumulating documentation and the growing countermemory narratives that had emerged more forcefully since 1998.187
For memory work, anniversaries are inherently prolific: As one editorial from El
Mercurio explains, “Anniversaries are moments when one can exorcise the ghosts of the
past which continue to pursue us, preventing us from constructing the future in peace.”188
The 30th anniversary of September 11, 1973 is certainly no exception as the reader is led
to wonder exactly what “ghosts” El Mercurio thinks require exorcising. Not surprisingly,
the paper’s coverage portrays the day of the coup, its meaning and how it should be
observed, as a day that continues to divide Chileans: “Thirty years after September 11,
1973, the wounds persist and are still open.”189 In the face of this undeniably meaningful
anniversary, El Mercurio digresses from its argument that the past can be closed off.
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Instead, it recognizes that the wounds left by Chile’s recent past are still painful,
particularly given the on-going revelations about the human rights violations committed
under Pinochet’s regime, and moves to engage the past rather than promote a punto final.
Three historical representations (re)surface in El Mercurio’s coverage during
September 2003. In the first place, the paper reprises its own reporting of the coup as it
(alone of all the newspapers) was able to record it. As it unearthed its original coverage
of the period, El Mercurio reformatted one section of its “National” pages everyday
(from September 1-11, 2003) to insert images of the coup (See Appendix, Article 4).
The second representation is of the anniversary of September 11, 1973, the
commemoration of the event, rather than the event itself. This self-reflective posture
offers insights into whether and how El Mercurio’s interpretation of the coup has
changed over the intervening three decades.
A third representation to play out in El Mercurio’s pages during this month
concerns the way the Chilean nation will (or should) remember September 11, 1973 in
the present, i.e., on September 11, 2003.
El Mercurio’s narrative of the 30th anniversary reinforces the paper’s dominant
interpretation of September 11, 1973 as the ultimate crisis of Chile’s political institutions.
Although El Mercurio reasserts that the crisis emerged primarily because of Allende and
the Unidad Popular, as its narrative evolved over the previous thirteen years, the paper
found itself more willing to acknowledge that on September 11, 1973, the military did
overthrow a civilian elected president and that throughout Pinochet’s rule human rights
abuses did occur. But the paper still proposed that the ultimate meaning of the coup lay
in the fact that it opened the door to a stronger democracy in Chile and, therefore, can be
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understood as a period that fits comfortably within Chile’s older history of continual
progress.
During this month, El Mercurio establishes a new approach to the question of
history and the effort to understand what happened in Chile’s past. While it temporarily
abandons its well-worn approach that the past should not be examined, El Mercurio
instead intimates that what matters when one reviews the past is one’s interpretive
understanding. This particular perspective surfaces in many of El Mercurio’s news
articles, editorials and op-eds. In the first place, El Mercurio will accuse the Left for what
it finds to be its subjective examination of September 11, 1973 and, therefore, for its
falsification of history. Secondly, the paper insists that, unlike the Left, the Right can see
the past as it actually occurred. Thus, El Mercurio will reinforce that it was Allende who
converted a democracy into a tyranny and Pinochet who, while he made errors along the
way, ultimately brought progress and stability to Chile. Finally many of El Mercurio’s
articles assume a more troubling tone, hinting that there are consequences, a price to be
paid, for misinterpreting the past. If the past is to be examined then Chile’s leaders and
the public better draw the “right” conclusions from that examination.
The Left and the Writing of History:
As previously stated, a frequent assertion in El Mercurio is that since the coup,
the Left only understood the past from its own perspective whereas the Right was able to
view it more objectively and more holistically. While this narrative thread emerged
before 2003, El Mercurio returns to it vigorously in early September 2003. A news
article quotes RN representative Sergio Romero saying, “If some want to falsify history,
stubborn facts, as those socialist comrades would say, are stronger and demonstrate that

113

here, the only ones responsible for the political violence which occurred are those who
wanted to change our democracy into a tyranny.”190 Romero accuses the Left of
falsifying history and reiterates that it was Allende who wanted to turn democratic Chile
into a totalitarian state. Pinochet’s former interior minister, Sergio Onofre Jarpa, echoes
this position and takes it further, calling for the Concertación to recognize that “it was an
error to try to impose a Marxist system which was rejected by the majority.” El Mercurio
quotes Jarpa’s argument at length:
The debate in the Concertación around the events of [September] 11 helps
us know who were the ones truly responsible for the chaos of that
period…[W]e have seen the positions taken by those in positions of
responsibility who had the possibility of taking Chile along a
constitutional, democratic road and who preferred to encourage
confrontations, illegal seizures of property, and the organization of illegal
armed groups.191
A close reading of Jarpa’s argument is quite productive. For Jarpa, the very fact
that the center-left Concertación government was still debating the meaning of September
11 proves (reveals) (“ha servido para saber”), by that act alone, that it (the Left) was
responsible for producing the “chaos” which led to the coup of September 11, 1973.
An editorial written by Pablo Rodríguez Grez, the former leader of the terrorist
organization, Patria y Libertad, further explores the project of history, observing that
“History cannot be written by hiding matters of such magnitude,” which seems fair
enough. Yet for Rodríquez Grez what was overlooked by the Concertación’s leaders, and
by implication, the Left, was “the totalitarian project of the Popular Unity “192 Consistent
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with the arguments of many of El Mercurio’s roster of editorialists, Rodríguez Grez
suggests that those who seek to honor Allende are unable to see that their fallen hero’s
real desire was to promote a “totalitarian project,” and are thus liable for the falsification
of history. In a relatively subtle step, yet one which El Mercurio is willing to take, the
paper suggests that those who read history incorrectly—who do not interpret the past as
its writers do—constitute a threat to Chile’s present.
In an editorial entitled “Los Dos Rostros del 11 de Septiembre” [“The Two Faces
of September 11”], Joaquin Fermandois suggests that there is a critical need to examine
both sides of September 11, 1973, again, a reasonable approach to the past. Yet he
stresses that a failure to appreciate the “positive” side of September 11, 1973 can lead to
a reliving of Chile’s “extremist” past:
…[T]he present attempt [by those in the government] to totally
delegitimize [the coup of] September 11 and the military government
speaks to the future of the country… The intent of such a unilateralist
view of the past, as has been generated over these past few months, could
cause us to slip off the path of (re)building onto one of extremism and
thereby to repeat another 1973.193
Fermandois’ contention that any historical account that fails to acknowledge what he
calls the “positive side” of the coup and the military government, thereby threatens the
stability of the country. As he repeats and extends the arguments of the much more
radical Rodríguez Grez. Fermandois embeds two important understandings in this
statement. In the first place, he asserts that any “thorough” historical examination of the
military’s actions on September 11, 1973 and thereafter must be “balanced,” and to be
balanced the “positive” must be presented alongside the “negative.” While those who
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write history cannot afford to close off perspectives that challenge their conclusions, this
outlook fails to recognize that the production of history is never a balancing act: if you
say something bad, you have to say something good.
More unnerving is the argument that a failure to read Chile’s history “correctly”
can lead to “another 1973.” This raises the central historical question of the meaning of
“1973” and its discursive instability, just as the meaning of “nunca más” has never been
stabilized. What is another 1973? Assuming that Fermandois does not view it as a fertile
period of leftist organizing and popular power but rather as a period of chaos, another
“1973” would require military intervention once again. The logic of the statement, then,
suggests that because the Left examines the past in a manner not considered to be
“balanced,” it implicitly opens the doors to another military intervention.
And yet, while Fermandois’ editorial seems to reflect a continuing conservative
narrative about the dangers of interpreting the past incorrectly, it also opens a new line of
commentary that only appeared among conservative writers after years of revelations of
Pinochet’s abuses. “The country re-encountered its direction and established its political
and economic strategy only at a high cost and not without errors and abuses which,
besides those in the human rights sphere, included dangerous temptations such as that of
identifying the State with a person.”194 This marks a process by which El Mercurio and
the Right will distance itself from Pinochet without either challenging the
accomplishments of the Junta (the country had, after all, “re-encounter[ed] its direction”)
or supporting any legal moves against him. Yes, it was dangerous to one’s leader think
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that he was the State, but that is part of history, and what’s done is done. History cannot
be revised or reversed.
Broader Perspectives and the Resurrection of Salvador Allende:
By the 30th anniversary of the coup, El Mercurio had opened up its columns to a
wider group of commentarists, and one notes opinion from more moderate voices. This
becomes evident as El Mercurio includes articles that reintroduce Allende as a historic
figure and honor him for his commitment to democratic ideals. Of course, Allende will be
more on people’s minds as the nation looks back at the 30 years since his death, but his
presence is also noted because of burgeoning efforts on behalf of the Concertación (in
particular President Lagos) and other members of Chile’s Left to commemorate
Allende’s memory in public ceremonies, bringing him within a national spotlight, not just
as part of leftist remembrance.195 And yet if conservative commentators begin to separate
the military’s project from Pinochet the man, so one can see in the pages of El Mercurio a
move to encourage the separation of Allende from his project.
To be true to the facts, Chilean democracy should give senator
Allende the honor of recognizing his democratic outlook…[O]ne
has to recognize senator Allende for the way in which he fulfilled
the [democratic] norms and practices of the Senate. And although
no one can exonerate him of the enormous responsibility which he
carries for the errors of his government, [which were] the
fundamental and determining cause for the destruction of
democracy, 30 years after his death his memory deserves to be
honored and respected.196
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The author of this piece, Jorge Schaulsohn, was a member of the Concertación and was
therefore not the typical El Mercurio spokesman. Yet Schaulsohn (El Mercurio, which
printed his article) pay Allende a decidedly backhanded compliment. On the one hand,
the destruction of Chile’s democracy is laid directly at his doorstep. On the other hand, if
Allende is to reappear in the public imagination, as controlled by El Mercurio, his reentry
will be limited: he is memorialized not as “President” Allende, but as a senator. It is
Pinochet who is remembered as Chile’s “President.” El Mercurio’s inclusion of a more
moderate voice thus actually helps reinforce its own memory narrative in which the roles
of Allende and Pinochet are stood on their heads.
In the days leading up to the 30th anniversary of the coup and in the weeks that
followed, El Mercurio engaged with Chile’s recent past in new ways. While it ultimately
adhered to its master narrative that Allende’s government destroyed Chilean democracy,
the paper abandoned its posture that Chile’s past must remain in the past. The presence of
the past, was almost palpable in Chile in 2003 and that “ghost” could not be put back into
the closet. While over the previous thirteen years El Mercurio approached the writing of
history from a point of negation—leave it in the closed box—around the 30th Anniversary
it realized that it could not ignore the wounds that continued to fester in the present. Yet
while its narrative shifted to reflect the continuity of history in the present, El Mercurio
used the anniversary year to reinforce its argument that it was the Left which continues to
disfigure history (by not acknowledging the UP’s role in destroying democracy in Chile),
thereby putting the Chilean nation at risk of repeating that past. But as before, El
Mercurio remains coy about who might cause Chile to relive its dark past.
******
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V. The National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (November
2003)
In August 2003, President Lagos issued an order to investigate those human rights
violations committed during Pinochet’s rule, which, unlike those examined in the Rettig
Report, did not result in death. The “Comisión Nacional Sobre Prisión Política y Tortura”
(National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture) or the Valech
Commission, as it became known after its chairman, the Auxiliary Bishop of Santiago,
Sergio Valech, was comprised of eight members and sought to locate victims of the
military, hear their testimony, and deliberate as to whether they should receive any
reparation.197 In November 2004, the Commission released a final report with the names
and testimony of the 35,000 Chileans it documented to have been tortured or abused for
political reasons between September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1990. The investigation and
its supporting documentation, which stretched to more than 1,000 pages, are heartwrenching and startling in their sheer magnitude.198
The release of the Valech Report represented a crucial step forwards in Chile’s
reconciliation process. Despite fourteen years of center-Left leadership, the victims of
political imprisonment and torture had not gained official or public recognition for the
injustices committed against them during Pinochet’s dictatorship. For over fourteen
years, victims of torture had lived side by side with their torturers and had yet to see
Chile’s government assume responsibility for the abuses carried by the state. The Valech
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Report was a sign of progress, and it was followed, in November 2004, by a public
acknowledgement by the head of the Armed Forces, Juan Emilio Cheyre, that the military
and other public officials were responsible for human rights violations. In a national
address following Cheyre’s, President Lagos echoed the Army chief, marking the first
“official” admission of the Chilean government’s responsibility for 40,000 cases of
human rights abuses.199
The Valech Report without doubt presented El Mercurio with a central challenge
since it has long insisted that human rights abuses under the military were not as
widespread as the report demonstrated. As the research shows, this moment demonstrates
how El Mercurio’s narrative evolved to incorporate a growing “counter memory,” in
particular the theme of human rights, into its own pages. Yet the Valech Report—and the
particular way El Mercurio represents it—is perhaps more significant inasmuch as it
shows the degree to which El Mercurio’s integration of counter or dissident memory had
become so standard that the reader barely notices, and may even expect it. Over the years
El Mercurio’s narrative has so “naturally” incorporated a version of the past that admits
to humans right abuses that its readers may forget that the narrative of human rights
violations was ever considered a counter memory. This is significant because it allows El
Mercurio and the Right to absorb counter memory narratives and normalize them into its
whiggish interpretation of Chile’s recent, authoritarian past.
Still, El Mercurio’s coverage of the Valech Report is critical because it signals the
end of the first phase of the construction of the paper’s post-Pinochet memory narrative.
In November 2004, one detects El Mercurio shifting its discursive efforts towards
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shaping a present and future that will protect its central post-dictatorship narrative. Thus
around the release of the Valech Report, El Mercurio uses ts historic positioning to define
chilenidad (Chilean national identity) as a means to safeguard against the destabilization
of its narrative.
El Mercurio’s coverage of the Valech report, then, reflects the paper’s work to
“rethink the nation” and prove that Chile is stronger, more united and more democratic
because of Pinochet’s government, a move which allows Chileans to look past the abuses
committed. At this historical juncture, El Mercurio begins to use its narrative as a means
to create the imagined community of the future, not just to interpret the past.200
El Mercurio employs a notion of Chilean nationalism to counter the negative past
unveiled by the Valech commission in November 2004. Specifically, the paper uses the
release of Valech both to demonstrate that Chile is united by its past and to inscribe a
new definition of chilenidad. While El Mercurio deploys this approach through a variety
of its articles, one of the most interesting examples comes from an editorial entitled “El
Cuerpo de Chile” [“Chile’s Body”], written by Eugenio Tironi.201 Tironi begins by
suggesting that, “It was time already to look straight on at this tragedy, our tragedy.”202
Tironi refers to the revelations contained in the Valech Report of the massive human
rights abuses as “our tragedy.” But, he argues, Chile is finally strong enough to confront
the brutal reality of the Valech Report, and that it must do so requires the remembering of
what happened in the country: “only nations that have memory, and that can reveal their
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entire past, without hiding even the most atrocious parts, can build a common dream
which they can share with others.”203 Through Tironi, El Mercurio argues that the Valech
Report has allowed the Chilean nation to overcome its shared past— “our tragedy”—in
order to realize a shared future with the common dream of national unity. While this isn’t
an unusual move for the paper, it does mark one of the first moments El Mercurio
invokes the role of memory in the project of creating national unity.
Chile, for Tironi, can now afford to remember because “today’s Chile is different.
We can now take on board…all the pain that led us to attack one another. We have to do
this in order to jointly look at the past without the weight of fear, shame or guilt, and
launch ourselves as a single community toward the future.”204 As generous as Tironi’s
commentary appears, it is highly problematic in a moment when the crimes of the past
largely have not been adjudicated. If the past becomes “our tragedy,” and “our collective
responsibility,” than individual responsibility disappears. If Chile can accept that “the
entire Chilean society failed,” then the past can be referenced without actual or literal
consequences in the present.205 Resorting to notions of collective guilt, as it did during
Pinochet’s arrest, has allowed El Mercurio to absolve individual actors (in particular
Pinochet) for the crimes of the past and also ensure that the past remains, safely, at a
distance. If we give Tironi the benefit of the doubt, his claim of a collective responsibility
at the moment of the release of the Valech Report encourages Chileans to evaluate both
their relationship and their government’s relationship to events of the past. But what is
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troubling about Tironi’s ‘collective responsibility’ is that he suggests that those who lack
responsibility for the torture of 40,000 people must assume as much of a burden of guilt
as those whose deeds had only just been reported.
Collective memory, the need to revisit the past and remember the facts of history,
emerges in El Mercurio’s discourse as a way for the paper to construct a sense of shared
guilt for the past as a “tragedy” rather than a crime. Yet it also emerges as a means of
fostering Chilean community and nationhood. To such an end, El Mercurio turns the
Valech Report into a point of national pride. Agustín Squella’s editorial entitled, “Sobre
la Tortura,” [“About Torture”] illustrates this: “I don’t know of another country which
has had similar experiences in the area of human rights which can show such results as
these… It is essential to establish a collective memory which is not only about repression,
but the solidarity expressed in hopes and dreams.”206 Like Tironi’s opinion mentioned
above, Squella locates Chile’s strength in its ability to collectively confront its past, even
though he seems to have overlooked other post-authoritarian regimes such as South
Africa where, many have argued, the process of reconciliation has gone much further
than the Chilean. Squella, however, hopes that Chileans see in the Valech Report a past
that is not only about repression but about future solidarity. What he doesn’t suggest is
whether those who suffered from the abuses should reside in the same collective memory
as those who abused them.
One of the main ways that El Mercurio frames Valech is to instill, to employ
Benedict Anderson’s terms, a sense of “imagined community” between the victims and
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the nation.207 To achieve this, El Mercurio emblematizes the victims (their faces and
testimonies) as the new Chilean nation, the new chilenidad. In a special report, El
Mercurio profiled several of the torture victims as they openly recounted their
experiences in detention centers (see Appendix, Article 5). Deceptively simple, this
article speaks volumes about El Mercurio’s project vis-à-vis the Valech Report. As the
faces of Chile’s tortured become the new face of the nation, El Mercurio capitalizes on its
traditional power to “think the nation” and enables “rapidly growing numbers of people
to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways.”208
That El Mercurio will put a literal face on the “ordinary” Chileans who were tortured
during the military government suggests that the paper, and the country, have modified
their views since 1990. And yet, framing a dark past by asserting a supposed unity of
purpose in the present is disingenuous and still allows El Mercurio to argue that history,
i.e., the process of investigation, documentation, and analysis of the past, is over. El
Mercurio thus distinguishes between acknowledging the past, on the one hand, and “reopening” it, on the other.
El Mercurio reasserts the same need to not re-open the ideological divisions of the
past in an editorial entitled “To Heal the Wounds, Not Reopen Them.” The author writes,
that “we should now avoid the danger that the Valech Report will be used to carry on
[preexisting] divisions [so that some can] obtain modest political advantages.”209 El
Mercurio implies that “a society which wants to be healthy and democratic” must
confront its past, but then lay it to rest in the catacombs of history.
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In conclusion, El Mercurio’s coverage of Valech marks the closure of a long
phase of its historical reconstruction. It has normalized an interpretation of the past that
reflects a seemingly “upside down” approach to history, in which Pinochet operates as
the democratic paradigm and Allende the totalitarian tyrant. After Pinochet’s arrest in
1998 and five years of incriminating revelations about his dictatorship, El Mercurio had
been forced to expand its narrative to represent at least the existence, and sometimes the
voice, of Chile’s torture victims. Yet while El Mercurio broadened its narrative in the
face of an unfolding reality, including evidence of personal corruption as revealed in the
Rigg’s Bank, it has done so in such a way that reinforces its whiggish interpretation that
Chile’s history has been one of unending democratic progress.210
Indeed, prevailing themes reappear even as new evidence is inserted. The Valech
Report, an investigation into the experiences of individuals who “threatened” the nation,
now converts them into the faces of post-dictatorial chilenidad. El Mercurio revises the
place of torture victims in the collective imagination and in so doing, not only searches
for a way to finally close off history, but also manages to navigate a very deliberate set of
criminal actions onto the terrain of national tragedy. As Simone Weil so importantly
observed, tragedy should not be confused with crime; in crimes, the choice is between a
morally good act and a morally reprehensible one, there are criminals and victims.
Tragedies are the product of having to choose between two morally equivalent acts set
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against each other. As the Valech Report, the Rettig Reports, and so many others have
revealed, what happened in Chile was a crime, not a tragedy.
Conclusion: El Mercurio and Social Memory After the Fact
During an interview I conducted in August 2008, I asked Matías Tagle
Domínguez, a senior history professor at Santiago’s Catholic University, how he thought
the Chilean people would remember the past 35 years of its nation’s history 50 or 100
years from now. Expecting (quite naively) that Tagle Domínguez would confirm my
supposition that the period between the coup of 1973 and the end of Pinochet’s seventeen
year dictatorship would be remembered as a heart-rending chapter of human suffering, he
responded: “as a period of deepening democracy.” Tagle Domínquez himself did not see
Pinochet’s rule as a period in which democracy was strengthened … but he thought
Chilean society would. After examining El Mercurio’s narrative reconstruction of
Chile’s recent history, Professor Tagle Domínquez’ answer sounds remarkably
clairvoyant.
Indeed it is as a period of democratic strengthening and progress that Chile’s
newspaper of record has re-inscribed Pinochet’s brutal rule from its post-dictatorship
vantage point. After analyzing the way Chilean history is popularly represented in the
pages of Chile’s leading newspaper, who can fault Professor Tagle Domínquez’ outlook
on the way in which future generations of Chileans will remember their past? El
Mercurio’s narrative, as we have seen, has turned a democratically elected government
into a Marxist “dictatorship,” and brutal dictatorship into a “revolution of liberty and
freedom.”
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As this thesis has shown, El Mercurio, the foremost voice of the Right, the media
outlet which has given itself the power to determine what is Chilean, has in many
disturbing ways succeeded in converting what has been confirmed by broad historical
consensus as a period of democratic rupture—a period of immense loss and civil
discord—into its own whiggish narrative of democratic progress. El Mercurio has not
only used history to absolve Pinochet and his military regime of the 40,000 cases of
torture and “disappearance” (some 3,000 of which resulted in death), but has used
memory to forewarn Chilean society and its center-Left government that if the past is not
“closed” —if the meanings it has created about the Pinochet dictatorship are not accepted
as inviolate by those in the present — Chile will run the risk of reaping the same
gruesome harvest in the future as it has in the past.
To be sure, El Mercurio’s national history narrative evolved and expanded during
the fourteen years covered in this study. From an analysis of the period beginning in
March 1990 with Chile’s transition back to civilian government and ending in November
2004 with the release of the Valech Report, one observes how the paper’s historical
account has broadened to include the memory narratives of those it did not initially
include—nor even acknowledge—before Pinochet left La Moneda. Of course the most
salient and concrete changes in El Mercurio’s discursive reconstruction are its
recognition and eventual incorporation of human rights violations into its own account.
Since it never previously admitted that such abuses were committed—certainly not at the
moment in which they occurred—El Mercurio’s integration of this “counter-memory” is
significant and speaks to the narrative evolution that has undeniably taken place in the
post-dictatorship period. In fact, one can argue that the disclosure and publication of
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numerous “official” reports on human rights violations committed during Pinochet’s rule,
beginning with those of the Rettig Commission, served as the basis of El Mercurio’s
emerging historical revisionism.
Yet, while El Mercurio accommodates and includes the narratives that reveal
Pinochet’s brutality, it does so in a way that nevertheless maintains both the paper’s
posture as a staunch defender of democratic ideals and Chile’s master narrator of
democratic continuity. As detailed in my analysis of each specific event covered, El
Mercurio deployed a variety of discursive approaches—variously mobilizing issues of
political institutionalism, economic growth and social integration, chilenidad (Chilean
nationalism), human rights abuses, symbolic exchanges between Allende and Pinochet,
and history and historiographic investigation—to support its positivist reading of
Pinochet’s regime. But, in the end, it is El Mercurio’s linking of Chile’s present—the
period after Pinochet—to the dictatorial regime that ultimately influences how future
generations will come to view Chile’s national past and its meaning to their present. If
those who study Pinochet’s brutal rule in 50 or 100 years remember (as El Mercurio
suggests) that the roots of Chile’s democratic fulfillment were planted as early as
September 12, 1973, then Pinochet is credited for a political project which, his own
writings reveal, he disdained at best and despised at worst.211
Who knows what will eventually join Allende’s shattered eyeglasses in the Museo
Histórico Nacional to bring the narrative of Chile’s history into the 21st century. The sole
issue that remains beyond dispute by those who study contemporary Chilean history is

211

An examination of General Pinochet’s speeches and public statements between the
coup and 1976, in particular, will reveal his political and temperamental dislike of
democracy, particularly when it could produce results with which he disagreed.
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the highly contentious nature of that examination. And, to the extent that the project of
history is built on competing interpretations of historical data, then we should not feel
disheartened. But if this examination of El Mercurio’s historical narrative has succeeded,
my hope is that it will have raised for its readers the risks of writing a history that not
only inverts the facts, but simultaneously insists on its interpretation and warns against
future revisionism.
In conclusion, this study has probed the complex dynamics governing the relation
of historical “truth” to social memory. It has intended to continually raise the question of
how lay citizens, not professional historians, are to understand and remember their past
when deliberately inaccurate historical narratives vie to become the “official” record of
what happened.
El Mercurio produced a narrative after the fact. Its veracity needs to be
questioned by citizens who not only lived during the Pinochet era but also by those who
seek the truth beyond a comfortable social memory.
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Appendix
1. El Mercurio March 8, 1990 A1 Photo of President-Elect Patricio Aylwin (Left)
with General Augusto Pinochet (Right).
2. El Mercurio March 25, 1990. A2 Editorial Patrick Whelan, “La Revolución que
nadie conoce”
3. El Mercurio October 31, 1998. A2 Editorial Pablo Rodríquez Grez “Historia y
unidad nacional”
4. El Mercurio September 11, 2003. C4 Image of El Mercurio front page from
September 12, 1973.
5. El Mercurio November 11, 2004. D14 Profiles of the torture victims from
“Informe Valech.” I interviewed Mrs. Marcia Scantlebury who appears in this
article.
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